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DNA TYPING: EMERGING OR NEGLECTED ISSUES
Edward J. Imwinkelried* & D.H. Kaye**
Abstract: DNA typing has had a major impact on the criminal justice system. There are
hundreds of opinions and thousands of cases dealing with DNA evidence. Yet, at virtually
every stage of the process, there are important issues that are just emerging or that have been
neglected.
At the investigative stage, courts have barely begun to focus on the legal limitations on
the power of the police to obtain samples directly from suspects and to use the data from
DNA samples in various ways. Issues such as the propriety of "DNA dragnets" (in which
large numbers of individuals in a geographic area are asked to provide samples voluntarily),
the validity of court orders for samples based on a lesser standard than probable cause, and
the permissibility of collecting DNA "abandoned" in public places are being litigated for the
first time. Using crime-scene samples to infer racial or ethnic characteristics is emerging as a
distinct possibility. Then there are the more than 282 million specimens of human biological
material stored by private and public agencies in the United States; in some situations, police
may well turn to some of these repositories to obtain samples. There is little or no case law
analyzing the constitutional restrictions on these investigative practices.
After the filing of charges, an accused sometimes moves to dismiss on the ground of the
expiration of the statute of limitations. However, there is a movement to carve out a DNA
exception to the statute of limitations in cases in which DNA evidence permits the
identification of the perpetrator after the expiration of the normal period of limitations. The
argument is that the legislative purpose of the statute is to prevent the maintenance of
prosecutions based on stale, unreliable evidence but that DNA evidence is so reliable that its
availability should lift the bar of the statute. However, little attention has been given to the
difficulties inherent in drafting such a legislative exception that will not be overinclusive.
At the trial stage, in a growing number of cases, after the defense attacks the weight of
the government's DNA evidence, prosecutors are commenting to the jury that the defense
has requested an opportunity to retest the DNA. Do such comments run afoul of the Fifth or
Sixth Amendment?
The purpose of this Article is to identi, and analyze such emerging issues. If the
criminal justice system is to realize the full potential of DNA technology while maintaining
the essential fairness of the system, it must come to grips with these issues in short order.
Fifteen years ago, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis began to be
applied to law enforcement.' Before long, its suitability for the
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I. The earliest instance of DNA analysis for legal purposes is reported in Alec J. Jeffreys et al.,
Positive Identification of an Immigration Test-Case Using Human DNA Fingerprints, 317 NATURE
818 (1985) (applying the multilocus probes described in Alec J. Jeffreys et al., Individual-Specific
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courtroom was bitterly contested. Significant questions were raised in
the popular press, 2 books from scientific publishers, 3 law reviews,4 and,
of course, in trial and appellate courts.5 Today, the controversy over the
scientific validity of forensic DNA testing has largely dissipated,6 but
more subtle issues of criminal procedure and evidence often arise when
DNA is employed in the investigations and trials. Unlike the question of
the scientific validity of the usual methods of forensic DNA analysis,
many of these new matters have yet to be extensively litigated. This
Article identifies some of these emerging or neglected issues.7
"Fingerprints" of Human DNA, 316 NATURE 76 (1985), and Alec J. Jeffreys et al., Hypervariable
"Minisatellite" Regions in Human DNA, 314 NATURE 67 (1985)). Soon after, this group applied
the technique to a serial-murder case described at length in JOSEPH WAMBAUGH, THE BLOODING
71-75, 79-82, 146-47, 150-54, 156-57, 167-71, 213-18, 227-28, 275, 282, 284 (1989),
excluding one suspect and incriminating another. In the United States, another form of DNA typing
made its debut in an unreported Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v. Petinikis. See COMMITTEE
ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN UPDATE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 174 n. 18 (1996) [hereinafter NRC I1].
2. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, Some Scientists Doubt the Value of "Genetic Fingerprint" Evidence,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1990, at AI ("Leading molecular biologists say a technique promoted by the
nation's top law enforcement agency for identifying suspects in criminal trials through the analysis
of genetic material is too unreliable to be used in court."). Several of the biologists referred to in
this story complained that their views were misrepresented, but the New York Times declined to
print their letters to the editor. See Andre A. Moenssens, DNA Evidence and Its Critics-How Valid
Are the Challenges?, 31 JURIMETRICS J. 87, 99-100 (1990).
3. See, e.g., Marjorie M. Shultz, Reasons .for Doubt: Legal Issues in the Use of DNA
Identification Evidence, in DNA ON TRIAL: GENETIC IDENTIFICATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 19
(Paul R. Billings ed., 1992), reviewed by John F.Y. Brookfield, Gene Justice, 363 NATURE 122
(1993) (dismissing the criticism as "parochial nonsense").
4. See, e.g., Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific
Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465 (1990).
5. For reviews of the challenges to admissibility, see Paul C. Giannelli, The DNA Story: An
Alternative View, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 380 (1997) (concluding that courts were too
willing to admit an untested technology); David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability Population
Genetics, and the Courts, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 101 (1993) (suggesting that the principal objection
to the computations of random-match probabilities was exaggerated); William C. Thompson,
Evaluating the Admissibility of Neiv Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons from the "DNA War, " 84
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1993) (reviewing the debate on population structure but not
discussing studies indicating that the effect is generally minor). Some of the leading court opinions
are reproduced in D.H. KAYE, SCIENCE IN EVIDENCE 167-206 (1997).
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. This Article builds on a report prepared by the authors for the Legal Issues Working Group of
the National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence, entitled FORENSIC DNA TYPING:
SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES (2000). The authors are grateful to Paul Bender, Susan Ehrlich, Rockne
Harmon, Dorothy Nelkin, Barry Scheck, Michael Smith, Ralph Spritzer, Jeffrey Thoma, William
Thompson, James Weinstein, and Richard Willing for information, comments, discussions, or
arguments about topics discussed in this Article.
DNA Typing Issues
Part I discusses constitutional problems that arise when the govern-
ment uses DNA evidence in investigating a crime. It focuses primarily
on methods of acquiring DNA from an individual suspected of
committing a crime and considers the constitutionality of compelling
suspects to submit to DNA sampling and of acquiring stored samples of
a suspect's DNA or medical records relating to these samples from
private medical providers or laboratories.' It also considers the constitu-
tionality of gathering DNA from large numbers of people to see whether
any have genotypes that match those seen in the trace evidence. It shows
that although the Fourth Amendment usually requires the police to have
probable cause and a warrant to compel a person to provide a DNA
sample, there are many situations in which police may be able to secure
DNA samples without these safeguards.
Part I also considers a second investigative use of DNA: deducing
physical or other characteristics of an individual whose DNA is found at
the scene of crime. Genetic typing will permit inferences as to ancestry,
physiognomy, or inherited disorders. Part I concludes that investigators
can use genetic data to make valid inferences without infringing any
constitutional rights.
Part II addresses legal issues that arise at a later stage in the justice
system, when DNA analysis is used as evidence in the prosecution of
persons charged with crimes. It discusses the admissibility of new DNA
tests and the results of proficiency tests at particular laboratories and
suggests that the rules of character evidence create a largely unrecog-
nized, and probably undesirable, obstacle to admissibility. It also
considers proposals that the durability of DNA evidence justifies
extending the statute of limitations for prosecutions for certain crimes. It
calls for more legislative sensitivity to the policies that underlie
8. This Article does not consider legal issues associated with collecting or using DNA from
individuals who are not specifically suspected of the crime that is under investigation. These issues
are central to building and administering many DNA databases for law enforcement and will be
addressed in a separate article that is in progress. The most comprehensive treatment published to
date is Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement's Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 767 (1999). For rejoinders to some of the criticisms advanced there, see
D.H. Kaye, Bioethics, Bench, and Bar: Selected Arguments in Landry v. Attorney General, 40
JURIMETRICS J. 193 (2000); David H. Kaye & Edward J. Imwinkelried, FORENSIC DNA TYPING:
SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES (2000). For discussion of the acquisition of DNA for the purpose of
proving that a convict is innocent, see Cynthia Bryant, When One Man 's DNA Is Another Man "s
Exonerating Evidence: Compelling Consensual Sexual Partners of Rape Victims to Provide DNA
Samples to Postconviction Petitioners, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 113 (2000).
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limitations on the period of criminal liability and a better understanding
of how the durability of DNA evidence interacts with these policies.
For some of these emerging issues, it is possible to make a reasonably
confident prediction of the courts' ultimate resolution of the questions
posed by DNA technology. However, other questions seem much closer
and require more attention to the underlying policies. The hope is that
this Article will stimulate judicial attention and scholarly commentary
by identifying the full range of issues and analyzing some of the
unresolved questions surrounding the use of DNA evidence.
I. DNA ANALYSIS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
Traditionally, DNA has been employed to link a suspect to a crime.
Finding that a suspect's DNA matches the DNA left at a crime scene, for
example, tends to incriminate the suspect.9 Inversely, when the DNA
does not match, the suspect usually can be excluded as the source of the
crime-scene DNA.'0 If trace evidence is to be used in these ways, the
police must secure samples of DNA from individuals who might have
committed the crime under investigation. Officials can secure such
samples in many ways. They can seek a court order to compel an
individual to submit to sampling; they can turn to a preexisting
collection of DNA samples; they can take a sample with the consent of
the individual; or they can try to locate a sample that the suspect has
abandoned.
As a matter of constitutional law, the principal constraint" on such
government action is the Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,' 2 which states:
9. It does so by suggesting that the suspect is the source of the crime-scene DNA. Of course,
other explanations may exist. The match might be a laboratory artifact, it might be coincidental in
that an unrelated person is the source of the trace evidence, or the match could be the result of
kinship in that a close relative of the defendant is the source. Suitable investigative and testing
procedures often can eliminate such alternative hypotheses. See David H. Kaye & George F.
Sensabaugh, Jr., Reference Guide on DNA Evidence, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 485 (Federal Judicial Center ed., 2d ed. 2000).
10. As with an inclusion, there can be other explanations for a reported exclusion. See Kaye &
Sensabaugh, Jr., supra note 9.
I1. The Self Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have less force in this context. See D.H. Kaye, The
Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 200 1);
f., e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966) (rejecting such claims with regard
to involuntary taking blood from an individual suspected of driving while intoxicated for the
Vol. 76:413, 2001
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."
However, what makes a search reasonable and when a warrant supported
by probable cause is required are not always apparent. The following
sections analyze the application of these requirements to the various
methods of acquiring DNA from suspects.
A. Legality of Compelling Suspects To Submit to DNA Extraction
Because the Search and Seizure Clause protects "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons," it applies both to restraining a
person and to searching the inside or outside of a person's body. The
Supreme Court made this clear in Schmerber v. California.14 Schmerber
was arrested at a hospital while receiving treatment for injuries suffered
in an automobile accident. He had allegedly been driving while
intoxicated, and a police officer directed a physician at the hospital to
withdraw a blood sample. 5 Chemical analysis revealed a high
concentration of alcohol in his blood at the time of the offense, and the
report of this analysis was admitted in evidence at trial in Los Angeles
Municipal Court even though the defendant objected that he never
consented to the test. 6 He was convicted of driving an automobile while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and the state appellate court
affirmed the conviction. 7 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, but only
purpose of measuring his blood alcohol concentration shortly after he had been injured in an
automobile accident).
12. Some state constitutions provide enhanced protection from searches and seizures and other
police practices. For example, in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and Gustafson v.
Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), the Court authorized broad searches incidental to the lawful arrest of
a person. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 230-35; Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 263-66. Under their state
constitutions, several courts have refused to follow Robinson and Gustafson. See, e.g., State v.
Taylor, 808 P.2d 324 (Ariz. 1990); People v. Innis, 604 N.E.2d 389 (II. Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Hoskinson, 879 P.2d 180 (Or. 1994).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
15. Id. at 758.
16. Id. at 758-59.
17. Id. at 759.
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after applying the Search and Seizure Clause to the act of removing the
biological sample.' 8 The majority began its analysis from the premise
that "[s]uch testing procedures plainly constitute searches of 'persons,'
and depend antecedently upon seizures of 'persons' . . . within the
meaning of that Amendment." 9 The Court emphasized that "[t]he
integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our society." '2
Because Schmerber established that the Fourth Amendment applies to
removing material from a suspect's body, as a general rule, police must
persuade a judge or magistrate that there is probable cause to believe
that the desired DNA sample will produce evidence linking the suspect
to the crime."1 With judicial authorization, police can use necessary
force to extract the biological material.22 Furthermore, once the
authorities legally have acquired a suspect's profile, they are permitted
to compare it to profiles from unrelated, unsolved crime-scene stains.23
The current state of the law appears to allow evidence legitimately
acquired for one purpose to be used for another purpose, at least if the
additional use entails no further search or seizure of the person.24
18. Id. at 766-72.
19. Id. at 767.
20. Id. at 772.
2 1. See, e.g., People v. Marshall, 244 N.W.2d 451,457 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976); In re J.W.K., 583
N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn. 1998); State v. Evans, 338 N.W.2d 788, 794 (Neb. 1983); In re Death of
Abe A., 437 N.E.2d 265, 266 (N.Y. 1982); Commonwealth v. Riedel, 651 A.2d 135, 139 (Pa.
1994).
22. E.g., United States v. Bullock, 71 F.3d 171, 175-77 (5th Cir. 1995).
23. See Bickley v. State, 489 S.E.2d 167, 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting the claim that
investigators violated Fourth Amendment by using a DNA sample taken pursuant to a search
warrant in a 1994 rape investigation to convict a man of two earlier rapes as well as the 1994 rape);
Smith v. State, 734 N.E.2d 706, 709-10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (involving DNA obtained by court
order in rape case in which defendant was acquitted on a consent defense; police found a match
between this DNA sample and a profile in the state's database of DNA from unsolved crimes; the
court held the database check was constitutional because "police conduct in comparing Smith's
court-ordered DNA sample with the DNA obtained from the V.0. rape is not a Fourth Amendment
search or seizure"); Wilson v. State, 752 A.2d 1250, 1268-72 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (stating
that because "[n]o new Fourth Amendment intrusion is involved," use of a previously legally
obtained sample to link defendant to present crime obviated need for new warrant even though
police had obtained one); People v. King, 663 N.Y.S.2d 610, 614 (App. Div. 1997) (stating that
police could use the profile from a sample obtained under a warrant with probable cause in a
second rape investigation even if they lacked probable cause to acquire the sample for that
investigation because "once a person's blood sample has been obtained lawfully, he can no longer
assert either privacy claims or unreasonable search and seizure arguments with respect to the use of
that sample").
24. Because the invasion of privacy was justified (by probable cause and a warrant for seizing
the DNA and searching its structure), the conventional additional-use theory would allow the later
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In some circumstances, however, either a warrant or probable cause
might not be essential to obtain the sample in the first place. For
instance, if a person is legitimately under arrest, the seizure of the
person is justified, and routine, non-invasive DNA sampling of all
arrestees solely for the purpose of creating a record of the true identity
of the individual is probably constitutional.26 Furthermore, according to
conventional wisdom, once the government has acquired the sample
further comparisons. See supra note 23. An analogy can be drawn to the situation in which police
searching a dwelling for specific stolen items record the serial number of an item not enumerated in
the warrant and check this number against a list of serial numbers of other stolen items. Recording
the serial number would not be considered a search if the number was in plain view. Cf. Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987) ("[T]he mere recording of the serial numbers did not
constitute a seizure, [but] taking action, unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion,
which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment or its contents, did produce a new
invasion of respondent's privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated the entry.").
Under the additional-use theory, checking the number against a list is not an additional search of
the person or the property and therefore would be allowed. Cf. State v. Wamre, 599 N.W.2d 268,
274-77 (N.D. 1999) (holding that the Fourth Amendment was satisfied when the police used a
serial number that was in plain view during a search to secure a warrant by telephone that allowed
them to seize the additional items).
The logic of the existing Fourth Amendment doctrine has been sharply questioned. See Harold J.
Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEx. L.
REV. 49, 53 n.25 (1995) (arguing that the current understanding of the Fourth Amendment should
be altered so that "each governmental use of information about an individual constitutes a separate
seizure of that person's effects" and hence "all such uses must satisfy the reasonableness
requirement").
25. A valid arrest requires probable cause to believe that the individual has committed an
offense. Alternatively, the presence of exigent circumstances may justify a seizure in the absence of
a warrant. This was the basis for upholding the search in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966). The Court reasoned that there was an exigency because blood-alcohol concentrations
decline rapidly. Id. at 770-72. However, DNA cases are readily distinguishable. In the typical case,
the police desire a DNA sample to test for permanent, identifying markers-markers that will not
evaporate or disappear with the mere passage of time. Consequently, it will be more difficult for
the authorities to justify a warrantless seizure ofa DNA sample than it would be to justify a similar
acquisition of a blood sample for intoxication testing. See In re J.W.K., 583 N.W.2d 752, 757
(Minn. 1998). In the absence of exigent circumstances, the police would be obliged to obtain the
functional equivalent of a warrant, that is, a court order that the suspect furnish a DNA sample. See
Thurman v. State, 861 S.W.2d 96, 100 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
26. See Kaye, supra note II (describing the types of sampling and the protections on disclosure
of the information that might be required to satisfy the Due Process and the Search and Seizure
Clauses of the Bill of Rights). Of course, a state may adopt a more restrictive approach under its
own constitution. See generally DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER & JOHN D. BIBLE, PRIVACY AS A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 174, 178 (1992); RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY
LAW 122-25 (1999) (listing state constitutional provisions).
419
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consistent with Fourth Amendment protections, the Search and Seizure
Clause does not bar its use for another purpose.
It also is likely that an order compelling a person to give a sample
could be issued on something less than probable cause. In Davis v.
Mississippi,28 the Supreme Court suggested in dictum such a procedure.
A woman in Meridian, Mississippi, reported that "a Negro youth" broke
into her home and raped her. Police, "without warrants, took at least 24
Negro youths," including Davis, "to police headquarters where they
were questioned briefly, fingerprinted, and released without charge. 2
9
After Davis's fingerprints were discovered to match those lifted from the
windowsill, he was indicted, tried, and convicted." His objection to the
admission of the fingerprint evidence was overruled, and the Mississippi
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on the theory that fingerprint
evidence is so reliable that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
does not apply to this evidence.3 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The
Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires the exclusion of
evidence that is the fruit of an unreasonable search or seizure, regardless
of how reliable that evidence may be.32 Reasoning that Davis was
detained without a warrant and without probable cause, and that he was
not merely fingerprinted but interrogated, the Court concluded that the
resulting fingerprints were inadmissible.3 However, the Court's
response to the state's argument that an arrest made solely for the
purpose of obtaining fingerprints should be allowed without probable
cause was less definitive. Although Justice Brennan, writing for the
27. See supra note 23. Under City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000), and
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001), the reuse would not be allowed if the
samples from arrestees were obtained as part of a program that had as its primary goal the
acquisition of DNA samples for later database searches. See Kaye, supra note I l.In addition this
reuse would not be acceptable under the theory advanced in Krent, supra note 24, at 53 n.25. A
narrower version of this view holds that when the police rely on a special justification to deviate
from the normal Fourth Amendment requirements of probable cause or a warrant, their utilization
of the evidence seized must be limited to uses that promote that special justification. Thus, if as in
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the police justify a warrantless seizure of evidence
on the theory that blood alcohol testing requires a sample to be taken without further delay, they
could not use the blood sample for DNA testing. This narrower version has merit, although no
published opinion has embraced it as a basis for excluding evidence.
28. 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
29. Id. at 722.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 723-24.
32. Id. at 724.
33. Id. at 726-28.
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majority of the Court, emphasized that "[d]etentions for the sole purpose
of obtaining fingerprints are.., subject to the constraints of the Fourth
Amendment, ' 34 he added that:
It is arguable, however, that, because of the unique nature of the
fingerprinting process, such detentions might, under narrowly
defined circumstances, be found to comply with the Fourth
Amendment even though there is no probable cause in the
traditional sense .... Detention for fingerprinting may constitute a
much less serious intrusion upon personal security than other types
of police searches and detentions. Fingerprinting involves none of
the probing into an individual's private life and thoughts that
marks an interrogation or search. Nor can fingerprint detention be
employed repeatedly to harass an individual, since the police need
only one set of each person's prints. Furthermore, fingerprinting is
an inherently more reliable and effective crime solving tool than
eyewitness identifications or confessions .... Finally, because
there is no danger of destruction of fingerprints, the limited deten-
tion need not come unexpectedly or at an inconvenient time.35
The Court opened the door to the possibility that "the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment could be met by narrowly circumscribed
procedures for obtaining, during the course of a criminal investigation,
the fingerprints of individuals for whom there is no probable cause to
arrest."'36 The Court virtually invited states to devise procedures to obtain
evidence of identifying characteristics on the basis of something less
than probable cause.
Many states seized on this invitation by adopting statutes or court
rules permitting the police to obtain evidence of identifying physical
characteristics after a showing of founded or reasonable suspicion.37 For
instance, Arizona authorizes magistrates to issue "an order author-
izing ... temporary detention, for the purpose of obtaining evidence of
identifying physical characteristics" on a showing of "[r]easonable cause
34. Id. at 727.
35. Id. at 727-28.
36. Id. at 728.
37. For discussions of the statutes and court rules adopted by the various states, as well as the
court rule proposed for federal practice, see Jerold H. Israel, Legislative Regulation of Searches
and Seizures: The Michigan Proposals, 73 MICH. L. REV. 222, 238-41 (1974); Angus J. Dodson,
Comment, DNA "Line-Ups" Based on a Reasonable Suspicion Standard, 71 U. COLO. L. REv.
221, 234-38 (2000); Note, Detention to Obtain Physical Evidence Without Probable Cause:
Proposed Rule 41.1 ofthe Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 712 (1972).
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for belief that a felony has been committed" and proof that the "physical
characteristics ... may contribute to the identification of the individual
who committed such offense."38 As in this instance,39 the language of
many of these statutes and court rules is broad enough to apply to DNA
samples.4°
One might argue that these statutes or rules are too broad-that unlike
the fingerprints in Davis, blood, urine, or hair samples should be treated
differently because they have the potential to reveal information that is
more significant than the pattern of whorls and ridges in a fingerprint.
Some support for this distinction can be found in Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n,4" which involved drug testing of railway
employees. The Court observed that "chemical analysis of urine, like
that of blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an
employee, including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or
diabetic., 42 The same concern with "private medical facts" arises with
38. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3905(A) (West 1999).
39. The Arizona statute specifies that "'identifying physical characteristics' includes, but is not
limited to, the fingerprints, palm prints, footprints, measurements, handwriting, handprinting,
sound of voice, blood samples, urine samples, saliva samples, hair samples, comparative personal
appearance or photographs of an individual." Id. § 13-3905(G).
40. Clyde M. Tande, Note, DNA Typing: A New Investigator, Tool, 1989 DUKE L.J. 474
(describing the breadth of the language of the various state statutes and court rules). For example,
Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(c) allows a court to order detention to "[p]ermit the taking
of samples of blood, hair and other materials of the person's body which involve no
unreasonable intrusion thereof" on the basis of an affidavit or testimony establishing
probable cause to believe that: (i) An offense has been committed by one of several persons
comprising a narrow focal group that includes the subject person; (ii) The evidence sought
may be of material aid in identifying who committed the offense; and (iii) The evidence sought
cannot practicably be obtained from other sources.
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(2)(vii) & 16(c)(1).
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled authoritatively on the constitutionality of these
procedures, in Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985), the Court referred approvingly to its
previous statement in Davis. Id. at 817.
41. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
42. Id. at 617. Read in context, however, this language does not necessarily support imposing a
requirement of probable cause. In Skinner, the Supreme Court was reviewing a judgment of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals striking down the drug testing regulations because they did not
require any showing of individualized suspicion-not even reasonable suspicion, let alone
probable cause. Id. at 612-13. The majority merely mentioned "private medical facts" in estab-
lishing that urinalysis constitutes a search. Id. at 617. It does not follow from the fact that a search
is involved that probable cause is required. That is precisely the point made in Davis, where the
Court indicated its willingness to relax the probable cause requirement for the undeniable searches
or seizures involved in compelling a suspect to provide fingerprints. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
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any samples that can be subjected to DNA analysis. To this extent, it
would be facile to say that DNA typing, like the fingerprinting in Davis,
"involves none of the probing into an individual's private life and
thoughts that marks an interrogation or search." '43 Certain parts of one's
genome-those that are related to otherwise nonobvious disease states
or behavioral characteristics-are as much, if not more, a part of "an
individual's private life" as are the hormones or other chemicals found
in one's urine.
However, all the other factors listed in the Davis dictum apply to
DNA sampling. Detention to obtain the sample cannot "be employed
repeatedly to harass an individual, since the police need only one set of
each person's [DNA types]." DNA analysis "is an inherently more
reliable and effective crime-solving tool than eyewitness identifications
or confessions."'45 And, "the limited detention need not come
unexpectedly or at an inconvenient time."'46 Moreover, in describing
these features of fingerprinting, the Davis Court recognized the
possibility that the police might abuse even fingerprinting to harass or
inconvenience a suspect.47 The suggestion of relaxing the probable cause
requirement presupposes the police will conform to the court order and
the judiciary will issue orders that avoid these problems. This premise
applies as well to the informational privacy concern voiced in Skinner.
Just as there is no need to detain an individual repeatedly or to detain a
person in the middle of the night, there is no reason for the police to
probe parts of the genome that conceivably could be used to indicate
disease states, susceptibilities, or the like.4" Because the judicial order
can limit the search to loci that are of strictly biometric interest, the
analogy to Davis is apt. Detention for DNA typing, as much as detention
for fingerprinting, "may constitute a much less serious intrusion upon
personal security than other types of police searches and detentions." '49 If
a person can be compelled to submit to fingerprinting on reasonable
43. Davis, 394 U.S. at 727.
44. Id. at 727-28.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 726-27.
48. See Kaye, supra note 8.
49. Davis, 394 U.S. at 727.
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suspicion rather than probable cause, he or she can be required to submit
to DNA sampling on the same showing.5"
B. Legality ofAcquiring Samples or Records from Medical Providers
or Laboratories
Rather than compel a person to submit to DNA sampling, police
might obtain DNA data on a suspect from preexisting samples or data-
bases. As of 1998, it was estimated that there were more than 282
million specimens of human biological material stored in the United
States, with samples from another 20 million individuals accumulating
each year.5 ' These samples are stored in academically based repositories
of scientists studying genetic disorders, commercially based repositories
that offer DNA banking as a service to researchers and individuals,
teaching and other hospitals that have acquired samples in the course of
clinical diagnostic or surgical procedures, laboratories that screen blood
samples of newborns for metabolic or other diseases pursuant to state
public health laws, and armed forces repositories of pathology
specimens and samples collected to permit identification of human
* 52remains. Although the Fourth Amendment plainly regulates police
50. See In re Non-Testimonial Identification Order Directed to R.H., No. 99-353, 2000
WL 1234251, at * 12-13 (Vt. Sept. 1, 2000) (upholding the constitutionality of a Vermont rule as
applied to an order for a saliva sample on the basis of reasonable suspicion); qf Doe v. Senechal,
725 N.E.2d 225, 231 (Mass. 2000) (holding that even if the Fourth Amendment applies to a private
action for assault and battery and other torts, a court-ordered buccal swab to test whether a member
of the staff of a residential treatment facility for mentally ill adolescents fathered the child of a
patient is a reasonable search and seizure).
The conclusion that a court order based on probable cause (or perhaps reasonable suspicion)
normally is required applies even if the police do not themselves demand or collect the DNA
sample, but direct or request private citizens to acquire the sample. Suppose that shortly after an
incident, a suspect goes to or is taken to a private hospital. While the suspect is still at the hospital,
the police leam of the suspect's location. The police contact the hospital staff and request them to
obtain a DNA sample from the suspect for law enforcement use. The private hospital would be
acting as a government agent in making the intrusion and the Fourth Amendment would apply. See
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614-16 (1989). There is sufficient state
action to trigger the Fourth Amendment if "the drawing of blood is instigated by the government,"
State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), by, for instance, requesting that an
emergency room doctor take a sample. Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308, 310 (Pa. 1992).
When the authorities intervene and request a sample even before the private entity takes one, the
otherwise private entity is acting as a government agent in seizing the sample.
51. 1 NATIONAL BIOETHIcs ADVISORY COMMISSION, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 13 (1999).
52. See id. at 13-15; Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
451, 464, 467-68 (1995); M. Therese Lysaught et al., A Pilot Test of DNA-based Analysis Using
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efforts to obtain samples directly from suspects,53 the prohibition against
unreasonable searches applies only to government action. 4 As the
Supreme Court commented in United States v. Jacobsen:55 "This Court
has... consistently construed this protection as proscribing only gov-
emmental action; it is wholly inapplicable 'to a search or seizure, even
an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an
agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any
governmental official."'"6
This state action doctrine raises the possibility that police may be able
to acquire preexisting information from cooperative private hospitals or
laboratories without a court order and without probable cause or reason-
able suspicion." This practice would fall outside the constraints of the
Fourth Amendment on two conditions: (1) the government did not
instigate the original acquisition of the data, and (2) in acquiring the data
that the suspect already has provided private entities, the state is not
engaging in any search or seizure.
Anonymized Newborn Screening Cards in Iowa, in STORED TISSUE SAMPLES: ETHICAL, LEGAL,
AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 3, 17 (Robert F. Weir ed., 1998); Jean E. McEwen, DNA
Databanks, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC
AGE 231 (Mark Rothstein ed., 1997).
53. When the police obtain a sample directly from a private citizen, there is undeniably
sufficient state action to bring the Fourth Amendment into play. E.g., In re J.W.K., 583 N.W.2d
752, 754-56 (Minn. 1998); State v. Binner, 886 P.2d 1056, 1057-58 (Or. CL App. 1994). The
extent of the government involvement is the same whether the motivation of the police is to obtain
the sample to add to a database or to acquire an evidential sample to be compared to a database.
54. United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928,
931 (9th Cir. 1994); State v. Grant, 620 N.E.2d 50, 60 (Ohio 1993); State v. Maxfield, 125 Wash.
2d 378, 384, 886 P.2d 123, 127 (1994), rev'don other grounds, 133 Wash. 2d 332, 945 P.2d 196
(1997).
55. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
56. Id. at 113-14 (quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980)); see also Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921);
Tims v. State, 711 So. 2d 1118, 1122 n.2 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (finding "no state involvement");
People v. Perlos, 462 N.W.2d 310, 315 (Mich. 1990) (same); State v. Nelson, 941 P.2d 441,445
(Mont. 1997) (same); State v. Enoch, 536 P.2d 460, 461 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) ("[I]fan independent
private citizen finds evidence and turns it over to the police, the evidence is legitimate.'); State v.
Guido, 698 A.2d 729, 733 (R.I. 1997) (finding "no state action').
57. If the medical provider or researcher were uncooperative, the authorities could resort to
compulsory process such as a subpoena. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, t0-11
(1973) (stating that "a grand jury subpoena to testify is not that kind of governmental intrusion on
privacy against which the Fourth Amendment affords protection, once the Fifth Amendment is
satisfied," but recognizing that "[t]he Fourth Amendment provides protection against a grand jury
subpoena duces tecum too sweeping in its terms 'to be regarded as reasonable"); State v. Fears,
659 S.W.2d 370, 375-76 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) (requiring only a showing that the object of the
subpoena is logically relevant to the subject matter of a legitimate criminal investigation).
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The first condition is relatively straightforward and often will be
satisfied for medical records and tissue samples.58 Pathology specimens
at private hospitals, for example, would fall into this category, but
newborn screening samples compelled under state law would not.
The second condition is more subtle, for it depends on the meaning
given to the phrase "search or seizure." The basic framework for
determining whether a form of data collection amounts to a search or
seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes is found in Katz v. United
States.59 In Katz, the government acquired key evidence to convict the
defendant of interstate gambling by attaching an electronic listening-
and-recording device to the outside of a public telephone booth. The
government argued that the interception was not a search because there
was no physical trespass and the telephone booth was a public place.6
The Supreme Court held that neither entry onto private property nor
inspection of tangible items is an essential feature of a search, for "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."'" The Fourth Amend-
ment protected the defendant, the Court explained, because "a person in
a telephone booth ... who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and
pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume
that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world."62 Because the federal agents had no warrant authorizing the
interception, the Court held that the search violated the Fourth
Amendment.63 In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan elaborated on the
majority's remarks. In perhaps the most famous passage in the Katz
opinions, he wrote: "[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."'" Applying this standard, he explained that "[t]he point is
not that the booth is 'accessible to the public' at other times, but that it is
58. The condition is fulfilled if, before the government's request, the private parties acted on
their "own initiative" and out of an "independent" medical or research "motivation." State v.
Comeaux, 818 S.W.2d 46, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
59. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
60. Id. at 352-53.
61. Id. at 351.
62. Id. at 352.
63. Id. at 354-59.
64. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants' expectations
of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable. 65
Although the courts have applied the Katz "test" in many contexts, for
present purposes the most important is the Supreme Court's 1976
decision in United States v. Miller.66 In Miller, the accused was charged
with possessing an unregistered still, carrying on a distillery business
without paying the whiskey tax, and possessing whiskey on which no
taxes had been paid.67 Prior to trial, the government served subpoenas on
two banks at which the defendant had accounts. The banks surrendered
copies of the defendant's checks and deposit slips as well as the bank's
own records of the defendant's accounts. The defendant moved to
suppress the documents, but the trial judge denied the motion and
admitted the evidence at trial.68 The defendant was convicted and later
appealed. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the banks' surrender of
the records violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.69
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit's decision
and reinstated the defendant's conviction. Writing for the majority,
Justice Powell relied heavily on Katz. The Court upheld the denial of the
suppression motion because "there was no intrusion into any area in
which [the defendant] had a protected Fourth Amendment interest.' 70
Because the defendant had transferred the checks and deposit slips to the
bank, he could not assert "ownership []or possession" as to any of the
subpoenaed records, 7' and "[a]ll of the documents obtained, including
financial statements and deposit slips, contain only information
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the
ordinary course of business."72
The defendant had argued that he retained an expectation of privacy
because he had made the information available to the bank only "for a
limited purpose."73 However, Justice Powell made short shrift of that
argument:
65. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
66. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
67. Id. at436.
68. Id. at 438-39.
69. Id. at 439.
70. Id. at 440.
71. Id.
72 Id. at 442.
73. Id.
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The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that
the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government .... This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.74
Justice Powell concluded that even if the banks were "acting solely as
Government agents in" transcribing and surrendering the information,
there was "no intrusion upon the [defendant's] Fourth Amendment
rights.
' 75
The logic of Miller has been applied to medical samples or records.
As in the case of financial information, the patient or research subject
neither owns nor possesses tissue samples or data that have been
"voluntarily conveyed" to health care providers or medical researchers.
Thus, in many of the cases challenging police requests for medical
samples and records, the lower courts invoke Miller to defeat the
defendant's claim.76
74. Id. at 443.
75. Id.
76. See. e.g., Tims v. State, 711 So. 2d 1118, 1123-24 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); People v. Perlos,
462 N.W.2d 310, 316 (Mich. 1990); State v. Guido, 698 A.2d 729, 734 (R.I. 1997); State v. Fears,
659 S.W.2d 370, 375-76 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983); Thurman v. State, 861 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1993); Robert M. Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain Role of the Physician in the
Protection of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C. L. REV. 255, 290-91 (1984) ("As a practical matter, in the
absence of a statute or a definitive court decision, the Miller decision is effectively being applied
when medical records are subpoenaed."). However, few cases deal with the specific question of
obtaining DNA samples from private entities. See In re J.W.K., 583 N.W.2d 752, 754-57 (Minn.
1998). The vast majority concern blood samples used for intoxication testing. E.g., People v.
Dolan, 408 N.Y.S.2d 249, 250-51 (Sup. Ct. 1978); State v. Enoch, 536 P.2d 460, 460-61 (Or. Ct.
App. 1975); Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308, 310-11 (Pa. 1992); Guido, 698 A.2d at 731-
32; State v. Comeaux, 818 S.W.2d 46, 48-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). To an extent, that area of
law is sui generis. In the United States, drunk driving exacts a huge toll in death and economic loss.
For that reason, every state has enacted an implied-consent law. ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL.,
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 176-225 (4th ed. 1995). By the terms of the
implied-consent statute, when a citizen obtains a driver's license, he or she impliedly consents to
later tests of his or her blood, breath, or urine alcohol concentration. The existence of these statutes
in every jurisdiction reflects legislative recognition of an important public interest in the prevention
of drunk driving, and the provisions of the statutes also weaken the argument that the citizen has a
protected expectation of privacy in either the sample or a medical record reflecting the results of a
sample's test. In the drunk-driving area, the implied-consent laws enable the government to
contend both that the statutes reduce the citizen's privacy expectations and that any expectations
are ones that society is unprepared to recognize as reasonable.
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Nevertheless, Miller might be distinguished on at least three bases.
First, the Miller Court stated that the bank records in question concerned
"commercial transactions." ' In contrast, a medical record can relate to
far more intimate aspects of a person's life,7" and the law should not
create significant disincentives to persons seeking necessary medical
advice and treatment. Although a patient has a greater privacy interest in
medical records than a business or individual has in bank records,79 it is
not clear that the interest is so much deeper that the two types of records
are distinguishable when the prosecution seeks the records to advance a
criminal investigation.0 Although recent polls indicate that the vast
majority of Americans are concerned about the privacy of their medical
records,8' there are countervailing indications of the relevant, societally
recognized expectations of privacy that are firmly settled. Most juris-
dictions have enacted a general physician-patient privilege,82 which
typically encompasses not only communications in a conventional sense,
but also any information that the physician gains by virtue of the
examination.83 Yet, the majority of jurisdictions do not recoguize the
privilege in criminal cases.84 Thus, several courts have pointed to that
77. 425 U.S. at 442.
78. See Perlos, 462 N.W.2d at 324 (Levin, J., dissenting) ("A person's medical records are an
intensely personal matter. Few persons would willingly share their medical records with the
state."); State v. Binner, 886 P.2d 1056, 1059 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) ("Such testing could reveal the
most personal of the medical details of our private lives that would not be known to the public in
general.'); Peter H. W. van der Goes, Jr., Comment, Opportunity Lost: Why and How to Improve
the HHS-Proposed Legislation Governing Law Enforcement Access to Medical Records, 147 U.
PA. L. REV. 1009, 1037-40 (1999).
79. See Thurman, 861 S.W.2d at 98.
80. Fears, 659 S.W.2d at 376 (asserting, after discussing Miller, "(w]e think that the same
principle applies to medical records as to bank records and that the above holding of the Miller
case is applicable").
81. See van der Goes, supra note 78, at 1011 n.10 ("A 1996 CNNITime poll indicates that 87%
of Americans want to be asked permission every time their medical records are accessed for any
reason.').
82. See State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 525 (rex. Crim. App. 1997) (noting that "most states"
have a physician-patient privilege). A minority ofjurisdictions do not recognize the privilege at all.
See, e.g., Tims v. State, 711 So. 2d 1118, 1122 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); Fears, 659 S.W.2d at 375.
83. See e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 992 (1995); Hale v. Superior Court (DeFelice), 34 Cal. Rptr.
2d 279, 280 (Ct. App. 1994); People v. Maltbia, 653 N.E.2d 402,405-06 (111. Ct. App. 1995); State
v. Comeaux, 818 S.W.2d 46, 54-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (Campbell, J., concurring);
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE: DOCTRINE AND
PRACTICE § 5.36, at 621-22 (1995); Comment, The Physician-Patient Privilege, 56 Nw. U. L.
REV. 263 (1961).
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limitation as evidence that society is unwilling to recognize a constitu-
tionally enforceable privacy expectation in medical records or samples.
In Thurman v. State,85 for instance, the Texas Court of Appeals pointed
out that the medical privilege is inapplicable to criminal cases;86 hence,
even if the citizen has a subjective expectation of privacy, society does
not recognize that expectation as reasonable in a criminal setting.87 For
that matter, many jurisdictions not only carve out an exception to the
privilege for criminal proceedings, but also require physicians to report
certain types of events such as violent injuries and child abuse to the
public authorities.88 One jurisdiction has enacted even more sweeping
legislation, requiring hospitals to furnish blood-test results to the
prosecutor on request in a criminal investigation.89 The reporting re-
quirements and limited scope of the medical privilege strongly suggest
that the person, who is the subject of the medical record, lacks a
"societally recognized," constitutionally protected privacy expectation. 90
Second, Miller might be distinguished by arguing that even if it
permits the government to obtain medical records from a private source
such as a hospital, it does not apply to a tissue sample. Certainly, the
analogy between a DNA sample and the records in Miller is, at the very
least, debatable, for there may be a more intense privacy expectation in
the sample than in the records reflecting the results of a particular test on
the sample. The sample represents a greater threat to privacy in that its
existence would permit further testing and the revelation of additional
information. Although noting that "[t]he precise question as to who
owns the blood upon extraction from an individual raises a novel point
84. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 998; Green v. Cooper Med. Hosp., 968 F. Supp. 249, 252 (E.D. Pa.
1997) ("Under Pennsylvania law, the physician-patient privilege does not extend to criminal
matters."), aff'd, 151 F.3d 1025 (3d Cir. 1998); Alexander v. Commonwealth, 708 A.2d 1251,
1257 (Pa. 1998); Hard,, 963 S.W.2d at 523.
85. 861 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
86. See id. at 100 ("Society can afford the physician-patient privilege in certain civil cases in
order to protect personal privacy, but the need to protect the public from crime requires disclosure
of the same information in criminal cases.").
87. See id. at 98-101.
88. See State v. Fears, 659 S.W.2d 370, 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983); Gellman, supra note 76,
at 274.
89. See People v. Perlos, 462 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. 1990) (discussing MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN.
§ 257.625(a)(9) (West 1990)).
90. State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In other contexts, the Supreme
Court has treated widespread state legislative patterns as persuasive evidence of societal
expectations. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. I, 12-14 (1996) (recognizing an impressive
number of states that had codified a psychotherapist-patient privilege).
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without apparent judicial precedent," a New York trial court suggested
that the "defendant had a [property] interest in the blood specimen
in... vial containers" retained by a private hospital.9 Also, in
upholding subpoenas, courts occasionally stress that the records in
question were "made [and] kept ... by the hospital"92 or that the records
were not "personal papers created or kept by the defendant," 93
suggesting that the outcome might be different if the defendant
personally had produced the subpoenaed items.
Yet, most courts construe Miller to apply to biological samples as
well as to mere records.9' In Miller, the prosecution sought not only
financial statements that the bank had generated, but also checks and
deposit slips from the defendant. Miller expressly rejected the argument
that there was a significant difference between the documents generated
by the bank and those prepared by the depositor.9 Financial statements
prepared by a bank are like medical records prepared by a hospital or
laboratory, and checks and deposit slips from the depositor can be
analogized to samples from the defendant. To this extent, Miller appears
pertinent whether the government seeks the original genetic samples or
merely records documenting the results of tests on those samples.
Finally, Miller could be distinguished in that the defendant
"voluntarily conveyed" the information to the banks96 while the
voluntariness of providing tissue samples might be questionable. For
instance, in People v. Perlos,97 a leading case98 involving blood-alcohol
testing, a dissenting justice of the Michigan Supreme Court argued that
91. People v. Dolan, 408 N.Y.S.2d 249, 252 (Sup. Ct. 1978). The usual view is that body parts
and tissues are not property, but that they are subject to the legal protections afforded to a person's
body. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 487-97 (Cal. 1990) (holding, in
response to a claim for conversion, that a commercially valuable cell line is not the property of the
patient from which the original cells were taken); Moe M. Litman, The Legal Status of Genetic
Material, in HUMAN DNA: LAW AND POLICY, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
17, 25-27 (Bartha Maria Knoppers ed., 1997) (reviewing cases and advocating a sui generis
classification in which genetic material is regarded as a hybrid of private property, common
property, person, and information).
92. State v. Gonzalez, 852 P.2d 851,855 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
93. State v. Guido, 698 A.2d 729, 734 (R.I. 1997).
94. See Perlos, 462 N.W.2d at 317 (stating, immediately after discussing Miller, that this line of
authority deals with "privacy rights in medical records [and] blood samples").
95. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,442 (1976).
96. Id.
97. 462 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. 1990).
98. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 2.7(d), at 638 (3d ed. 1996).
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although under the implied consent statute a driver agrees in advance to
a government test of his or her alcohol concentration, the driver does not
consent to a search of medical records reflecting a test conducted by a
private entity. As the dissent observed, "[i]n today's society, a person
has little choice but to undergo medical treatment at a medical facility,
generally licensed by and authorized to operate by the state. Few persons
have the ability to obtain medical treatment in their homes ....
Nevertheless, the majority relied on Miller to uphold a state statute
mandating that hospital personnel disclose to the prosecution the results
of any blood-alcohol test of a driver involved in an accident.'00
When a conscious person in need of medical treatment is admitted to
a hospital, the patient consents to treatment'0' and explicitly or implicitly
agrees to medical testing incident to the treatment. The patient therefore
voluntarily conveys the data disclosed by the test results to the
institution's staff in the same manner that the depositor in Miller
"voluntarily conveyed [information] to the banks [to be] exposed to their
employees in the ordinary course of business."'0 2 Given the rules of
medical ethics,0 3 the patient might have a stronger subjective expec-
tation that the hospital will keep the information in question
confidential. However, Miller states that when a person voluntarily
reveals information to a third party, for Fourth Amendment purposes the
person "takes the risk" that the third party will disclose the information
"to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed ... only
99. Perlos, 462 N.W.2d at 324 & n.7 (Levin, J., dissenting); see also State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d
516, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ("[R]elease of medical information to hospitals is less optional
than the release of financial information to banks. A person can choose not to maintain a bank
account, but it hardly seems reasonable to expect someone to forego medical attention.").
100. See Perlos, 462 N.W. 2d at 316.
101. If the person in need of emergency medical treatment is unconscious, the hospital will still
administer treatment on the legal theory underlying the implied-intent statutes: the hospital
personnel may ordinarily assume that if the person were conscious and understood his or her
condition, he or she would want to be treated. See People v. Woodson, 630 N.Y.S.2d 670, 671
(Sup. Ct. 1995) (involving defendant who was unconscious and comatose when he was originally
admitted to the hospital); State v. Guido, 698 A.2d 729, 732 (R.I. 1997) (involving defendant who
was unconscious when he was found, and the hospital staff withdrew a blood sample during
emergency-room treatment); Hard), 963 S.W.2d at 526-27 ("Many statutes also permit officers to
conduct a chemical test (without a warrant) on an unconscious person .... Some statutes even
permit obtaining a sample for chemical testing (without a warrant) from an unconscious person
even when that person is not under arrest."); State v. Jenkins, 259 N.W.2d 109, 110 (Wis. 1977)
(involving defendant who was in and out of consciousness after an accident).
102. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
103. See SUZANNE B. MCNtCOL, LAW OF PRIVILEGE 342 (1992) (citing the American Medical
Association and the World Medical Association's codes).
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for a limited purpose and the [person expects that] confidence placed in
the third party will not be betrayed."' ' 4
In sum, the argument that Miller governs both medical records and
samples is strong, but not conclusive. The statutory patterns, restricting
the medical privilege and imposing reporting duties on physicians, lend
powerful support to the view that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in medical records or samples. Admittedly, a minority of cases
reject this conclusion' 05-sometimes on dubious grounds' 06 -and Miller
itself has been the target of intense criticism. 7 However, the majority
view is that if the private hospital or laboratory obtains a biological
sample on its own initiative for lawful medical reasons, its subsequent
surrender of the sample to the authorities does not violate any constitu-
104. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
105. See Hardy, 963 S.W.2d at 525 ("No consensus exists in court decisions on whether an
expectation of privacy exists in medical records.'); id. at 524 (acknowledging a division of
sentiment in the Texas cases, then stating that "[flour out of five [Texas courts] held that society
does not recognize as reasonable an expectation of privacy in those kinds of records"); see also
State v. Nelson, 941 P.2d 441, 448 (Mont. 1997) ("[M]edical records have not been historically
protected by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures."); I
LAFAVE, supra note 98, § 2.7(d), at 640.
The minority view that the suspect retains a constitutionally protected privacy expectation in the
sample would not necessarily prevent the state from obtaining the medical information or sample.
The state usually has to establish founded suspicion or even probable cause to obtain a court order
that the hospital or laboratory deliver the record or the sample. See Nelson, 941 P.2d at 449
(finding "a compelling state interest" in the form of "probable cause").
106. For example, in People v. Woodson, 630 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1995), an unconscious
patient was taken to a private hospital. The hospital personnel prepared vials of blood and urine
specimens. The grand jury subpoenaed the samples, the hospital turned over both vials, and the
authorities conducted toxicological tests. The defendant argued that the authorities' acquisition of
the two vials violated the Fourth Amendment and moved to suppress the vials and testimony as to
their contents. Id. at 671. A New York Supreme Court granted the motion and declared that "[b~y
now, it is settled law that a hospitalized defendant retains a Fourth Amendment right in blood and
urine samples." Id. The court in effect ruled the suspect had an objectively reasonable expectation
of privacy in his hospital records. See id. at 671-74. However, the reasoning in Woodson is
dubious. The judge cited People v. Natal, 553 N.E.2d 239 (N.Y. 1990), to support the exclusion of
the evidence, but Natal has nothing to do with blood or urine samples. Woodson, 630 N.Y.S.2d at
787. Natal involved clothing and personal effects taken from a defendant when he was placed in
pretrial confinement. Natal, 553 N.E.2d at 240-41. Although the Natal court held that the district
attorney had abused the subpoena power, the court ruled that "inspection of personal effects
previously exposed to police view ... does not invade any substantial privacy interest." Id. at 241.
Moreover, the Woodson court does not so much as mention, much less evaluate, the possibility that
Miller is pertinent. Similarly ignoring Miller, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized a
privacy interest in medical records in Commonwealth v. Riedel, 651 A.2d 135, 138-39 (Pa. 1994).
107. See, e.g., 1 LAFAVE, supra note 98, § 2.7(d), at 639-40.
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tionally protected expectation of privacy.I°8 The same is true, even more
clearly, of laboratory findings or medical records involving the
samples.'0 9 Although it would be desirable to have additional statutory
and regulatory protection for medical records,"' it is difficult to escape
the conclusion that under Miller and its progeny, the Fourth Amendment
does not confer that protection.I"'
However, the Court's recent decision in Ferguson v. City of
Charleston"' complicates the analysis. Ferguson involved a challenge to
a set of policies and procedures developed by a public hospital, the
Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC), and local law
enforcement authorities'13 MUSC was administering diagnostic tests,
including screens for cocaine use, to patients receiving prenatal
treatment. If a patient tested positive, the MUSC staff referred her for
108. The courts have employed a variety of rationales to justify this view. Some reason that the
suspect had bailed the sample with the private hospital and that as bailee, the hospital "may consent
to ... permit the warrantless search and seizure." People v. Dolan, 408 N.Y.S.2d 249, 252 (Sup. Ct.
1978). Other courts simply assert that if a private hospital properly obtains a sample for medical
reasons, as "an independent private citizen" it may "tum[] it over to the police." State v. Enoch,
536 P.2d 460, 461 (Or. Ct. App. 1975). But still other courts invoke Miller. See, e.g., Thurman v.
State, 861 S.W.2d 96, 98-101 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) Although Thurman involved a subpoena for
medical records, the court used broad language, expansive enough to apply to samples as well, and
noted that "[c]ourts in other states have reached the same conclusion." Id.
109. See State v. Gonzalez, 852 P.2d 851 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Fears, 659 S.W.2d 370
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1983); Conrad v. Texas, No. 14-96-00167-CR, 1997 WL 764527 (Tex. Ct. App.
1997), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1068 (1999); Thurman, 861 S.W.2d 96. Many of these courts not
only cite Miller but also treat it as dispositive. See People v. Perlos, 462 N.W.2d 310, 316-17
(Mich. 1990); Fears, 659 S.W.2d at 375-76; Gellman, supra note 76, at 290-91. In Nelson, the
Montana Supreme Court found a protected expectation of privacy in medical records under its state
constitution. 941 P.2d at 447-49. However, the Montana court pointed out that its cases construing
its constitution protect privacy "more strict[ly] than" the cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 447. Indeed, the Montana court noted that "medical records have not
been historically protected by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against reasonable searches and
seizures." Id. at 448.
110. For a discussion of the principles that might guide the formulation of such legislation, see
Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Genetic Privacy and the Law: An End to Genetics
Exceptionalism, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (1999). After years of congressional failure to enact a
comprehensive medical privacy law during the Clinton Administration, the executive branch has
issued rules to protect medical records. See Brian Nuterangelo & Susan D. Drake, Health Care
Law: HIPPA Rule and Employers, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 26, 2001, at B7; Benedict Carey, Patients Can
Rest Easier When It Comes to Medical Privacy Issues, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2001, available at
2001 WL 2480995.
111. Of course, it would not be unthinkable to extend the Fourth Amendment in that manner.
However, that extension would necessitate a doctrinal reformulation and the rethinking of several
leading modem precedents, notably Miller and its progeny.
112. 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001).
113. Id. at 1284-86.
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counseling and treatment." 4 Despite the referrals, the incidence of
cocaine use among the patients remained the same." s To give patients a
stronger incentive to refrain from drug use, MUSC contacted the local
law enforcement authorities. t16 Together, they developed the set of
policies and procedures in question." 7 Under these procedures, patients
meeting certain criteria were tested for cocaine, and a chain of custody
for the sample was maintained."' In their final form, the procedures
provided that if a woman tested positive for cocaine either during
pregnancy or after labor, she would be given an opportunity to avoid
arrest by consenting to substance-abuse treatment." 9 The document
codifying the policy specified the range of possible criminal charges and
the logistics of police notification and arrest. 20
Several women who were arrested challenged the constitutionality of
the practice under the Fourth Amendment.' 2' A six-justice majority
invalidated the program. 2 Six justices agreed that MUSC's surrender of
the test results to the police constituted a separate Fourth Amendment
intrusion." In response to the public hospital's practice of regularly
submitting copies of team documents discussing the women's progress,
Justice Stevens wrote that "[t]he reasonable expectation of privacy
enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is
that the results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical
personnel without her consent."' 24
Although, on its face, this statement is quite broad, Ferguson deals
only with a continuing program developed by the police and a public
hospital requiring the systematic disclosure of patient records for the
"primary purpose" of advancing "the general interest in crime
114. Id. at 1284.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1285.
118. Id. at 1291.
119. Id. at 1285.
120. Id. at 1285, 1291.
121. Id. at 1284.
122. Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy filed a concurrence in the
judgment, and Justice Scalia filed a dissent in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
joined. Id. at 1284, 1293, 1296.
123. Id. at 1284.
124. Id. at 1288.
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control."1 25 The involvement of law enforcement was so "extensive...
at every stage of the policy' ' 26 that the hospital was acting "as an
institutional arm of law enforcement.' 2 7
As such, Ferguson is distinguishable from the typical fact situation
discussed in Part I.A, namely, a case in which medical personnel in the
private sector surrender information that they previously obtained for
legitimate, health-related reasons. Indeed, in a footnote, Justice Stevens
suggested the distinction between the institutional program in Ferguson
and the problem discussed here. 8 After noting the existence of laws
requiring medical personnel to report certain types of criminal activity to
the police, Justice Stevens stated:
While the existence of such laws might lead a patient to expect that
members of the hospital staff might turn over evidence acquired in
the course of treatment to which the patient has consented, they
surely would not lead a patient to anticipate that hospital staff
would intentionally set out to obtain incriminating evidence from
their patients for law enforcement purposes.'29
If the medical personnel previously obtained the data from the patient
during the course of a regular hospital procedure, they could not be said
to have "intentionally set out to obtain incriminating evidence . . . for
law enforcement purposes.' 130 In that situation, where private medical
facilities later surrender information to the authorities, Miller-not
Ferguson-presumably would still govern.
C. Acquiring DNA from Inadvertently Abandoned Samples
The police also might obtain a suspect's DNA sample surreptitiously,
without detaining the person. Saliva deposited on a coffee cup at a
restaurant, for example, can be collected and analyzed.' 3 1 Police
125. Id. at 1290.
126. Id. at 1283.
127. Id. at 1294 (Kennedy, J., concurring). For his part, Justice Kennedy stressed the
"substantial law enforcement involvement in the policy from its inception." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). He emphasized that "the active use of law enforcement ... [was] an integral part of
[the] program." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 1288 n.13.
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. Id.
13 1. In New York City, police used this tactic to acquire DNA from a suspected serial killer and
rapist. Richard Willing, As Police Rely More on DNA, States Take a Closer Look, USA TODAY,
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unsuccessfully chasing a wounded felon might find sufficient blood has
dripped onto the sidewalk for DNA profiling to be conducted. It could
be argued that such activity is not a search (and hence requires neither
probable cause nor a warrant) because the individual, having abandoned
the material in a public place, retains no reasonable expectation of
privacy in it. The Supreme Court used this reasoning in California v.
Greenwood' in holding that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
"the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside
the curtilage of a home."'3 The Court commented:
It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the
side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children,
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public ....
Moreover, respondents placed their refuse at the curb for the
express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector,
who might himself have sorted through respondents' trash or
permitted others, such as the police, to do so.'
However, depositing DNA in the ordinary course of life when
drinking, sneezing, or shedding hair, 35 dandruff, 3 6 or other cells'37
differs from placing private papers in a container on the street to be
collected as garbage. Depositing paper in the trash is generally a voli-
tional act. Someone intent on preserving the secrecy of the papers can
shred the papers or dispose of them in other ways that would defeat
normal police surveillance. Leaving a trail of DNA, however, is not a
conscious activity. The deposition of DNA in public places cannot be
avoided unless one is a hermit or is fanatical in using extraordinary
June 6, 2000, at IA; The Crier Report: Mandatory DNA Testing (Fox television broadcast, Mar.
11, 1999), available at 1999 WL 18330169. Similar strategies have yielded samples in Florida,
Maryland, and Massachusetts. See Jerry Adler & John McCormick, The DNA Detectives,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 16, 1998; Spit Gives DNA Match for Rape Suspect, FLA. TODAY, Oct. 24, 1998,
at B8, available at 1998 WL 18648417; Willing, supra; Dan Kraut, Baltimore Cop Charged in
Bank Robberies, May 18, 2000, http:l/dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ao/20000518/cr/baltimore-cop_
charged in bank robberies_1.html, (last visited May 19, 2000) (reporting on suspect from whom
saliva specimen was "surreptitiously obtained").
132. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
133. Id. at 37.
134. Id. at 40.
135. See R. Higuchi et al.,DNA Typingfrom Single Hairs, 332 NATURE 543 (1988).
136. See Birgit Herber & Kurt Herold, DNA Typing of Human Dandruff, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI.
648 (1998).
137. See I. Findlay et al., DNA Fingerprintingfrom Single Cells, 389 NATURE 555 (1997).
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containment measures. In this setting, the inference of intent to abandon
is markedly weaker.
If the police collection of inadvertently deposited DNA cannot be
justified solely on an abandonment theory, under Katz the question
becomes whether society does or should recognize as reasonable the
expectation that government agents will not follow one about to obtain
and analyze DNA that almost inevitably is left in public places. 38 A case
can be constructed that such an expectation exists. The public is
extremely concerned with preserving genetic privacy. Many states have
enacted legislation to preserve the confidentiality of genetic information,
and a few have even labeled a person's genotypes as the property of the
individual.' 39 Furthermore, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass 'n"4° lends support to this argument. In Skinner, the Federal Railroad
Administration had promulgated regulations mandating blood and urine
tests of employees involved in certain train accidents and authorizing the
railroads to administer breath and urine tests on employees who violated
particular safety rules. Some provisions authorized breath and urine tests
based on a "reasonable suspicion" of drug or alcohol impairment, but
others did not require any showing of individualized suspicion. Railway
employees alleged that this system violated their Fourth Amendment
rights. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit invalidated the regula-
tions, holding that the drug testing required reasonable suspicion.' 4' The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, reasoning that the
compelled collection of breath and urine samples was a search but the
practice was reasonable because the government had a special need to
ensure that railway personnel were not using substances that might cloud
their judgment and impair their performance. 142 The majority recognized
138. It might seem that police have no more obligation to secure a warrant before seizing DNA
in a place they have right to be than they do to secure a warrant or other order before dusting a
crime scene for fingerprints, viewing the site of a rape for semen, or looking for traces of blood on
or near the corpse of person who obviously struggled with an assailant. However, these efforts to
locate physical or biological evidence that later can be traced to an individual are quite different
from the practice of following an individual already suspected of a crime to pick up that person's
DNA. In the former situation, the involvement of a magistrate would be pointless, for there is
nothing for a magistrate to consider. In the latter, the magistrate could screen the information the
police already have to ensure that there is sufficient reason to invade the target's genetic privacy.
139. See D.H. Kaye, Respecting Genetic Privacy: The ASU-SB Conference on Law, Science and
Technology, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 1,2 (1999).
140. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
141. Id. at 612-13.
142. Id. at 620.
438
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that "[u]nlike the blood-testing procedure at issue in Schmerber, the
procedures prescribed by the... regulations for collecting and testing
urine samples do not entail a surgical intrusion into the body.'
143
Nonetheless, the opinion concluded that urine sampling followed by
urinalysis was a search, in part because "chemical analysis of urine, like
that of blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an
employee, including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or
diabetic."'" Similarly, DNA testing can reveal "private medical facts"
about the individual.
However, Skinner is distinguishable in that urinalysis involves a
much more extensive intrusion into privacy: the possible revelation of
private information, compelled excretion of bodily fluid, and monitoring
the normally private act of excretion. 146 Unlike the collection of blood
from the suspect in Sehmerber, collecting DNA left in public places
entails neither a bodily invasion nor a seizure of the person. It seems
clear that, in a public restaurant after a suspect departed, the police could
pick up a coffee cup used by the suspect and, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, examine it for fingerprints.'14 Courts may find it a small
step to conclude that the warrantless collection of inadvertently
abandoned DNA does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Before taking this step, however, courts should consider the extent to
which meaningful, personal information that would not be available to
private citizens will fall into the hands of government agents interested
in accessing this information. When society enters an era in which DNA
analyzers are as accessible as home pregnancy-test kits, the argument for
an expectation of privacy will be weak. But in a world still at the
143. Id. at 617.
144. Id.
145. See United States v. Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. 50, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (relying on this facet of
informational privacy to conclude that compelling a saliva sample for DNA testing is a search or
seizure).
146. See id. at 55-56.
147. Research revealed no case holding, or even implying, that the collection of a fingerprint in
a public area amounts to a Fourth Amendment intrusion in fact. After a person has been arrested,
the collection of fingerprints directly from the person with no showing beyond the validity of the
arrest itself is routinely upheld. See Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1 st Cir. 1964);
Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1963); State v. Inman, 301 A.2d 348, 354
(Me. 1973); Commonwealth v. Young, 572 A.2d 1217, 1224 (Pa. 1990). For cases applying the
abandonment theory to other materials that are at least as problematic as fingerprints, see United
States v. Cox, 428 F.2d 683, 687-88 (7th Cir. 1970) (hair cut by prison barber); Venner v. State,
367 A.2d 949, 955-56 (Md. 1977) (contents of hospital bedpan).
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threshold of an age of molecular biology, what expectation is reasonable
is less obvious. Privacy expectations should turn on the incentives and
disincentives for the government to acquire DNA information that is
truly sensitive as well as the risk that this information will be used to
harm individuals. For law enforcement purposes, there is little incentive
to probe areas of the genome that would determine characteristics not
discernible to individuals acquainted with a suspect. Identification rarely
will be aided by disease prediction, for example, and the risk that police
or laboratory personnel will be curious about and well positioned to
collect the latter sort of information does not seem large. Rather, there
are disincentives to such investigations. The existence of numerous laws
restricting the use and release of genetic information on individuals by
insurers, employers, and law enforcement personnel is pertinent here. 48
Although further experience with DNA samples in the criminal justice
system could lead to a reassessment, for the present the better course is
to treat human cells left in public places like fingerprints in deciding
what expectation of privacy is reasonable.
D. Securing the Consent of Suspects or Others
1. Voluntariness Under the Fourth Amendment
In addition to compelling individuals to submit DNA samples or
acquiring samples indirectly from medical-care providers, researchers,
or from other locations, the authorities might simply ask a suspect to
provide a sample. Even if the acquisition of the sample constitutes a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment and the authorities do not obtain a
warrant or court order, a suspect's consent is an adequate justification
for a search or seizure.'49 What, then, must authorities do to obtain
legally effective consent? When that question arose with respect to
waivers of the privilege against self-incrimination embodied in the Fifth
Amendment, early Supreme Court cases applied a general voluntariness
test.' 50 However, in 1966, the Court mandated in Miranda v. Arizona'
148. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE, art. 88B, § 12A(p) (2000) (creating criminal penalties for
unauthorized disclosure or receipt of "individually identifiable DNA information contained in the
statewide DNA data base system or ... repository"); Kaye, supra note 139, at 1-2 (collecting
references to genetic privacy and discrimination legislation).
149. See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946).
150. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942);
Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 547 (1941) (citing White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940)); Lomax v.
Vol. 76:413, 2001
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that the police administer specific warnings to a suspect in custody to
ensure that any consent to interrogation was voluntary in the specific
sense that the suspect's waiver was intelligent and knowing. 52 In
particular, police must advise a suspect of the right to remain silent.53
The Court has taken a different approach to waivers of one's Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. In
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,'T 4 the Court confirmed the continued
applicability of a general voluntariness test and expressly held that
police need not warn a suspect of the right to refuse to consent to a
search. 55 The administration of such a warning is simply one factor in
the totality of the circumstances that must be considered in determining
the voluntariness of the consent. 56 Schneckloth sharply distinguished
between the Fourth and Fifth Amendment settings. The Court emphasiz-
ed that while Miranda warnings helped to ensure the reliability of any
confession by a suspect, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule has
little or nothing to do with the reliability of the seized evidence.'57
According to the Court, concerns about the reliability of the evidence
and the integrity of the fact-finding process justify a more rigorous
standard under the Fifth Amendment than under the Fourth.
158
Although the Schneckloth standard is more lax than the Fifth
Amendment test, 59 even Schneckloth has teeth. In some cases, Fourth
Amendment consent has been found involuntary. For example, in
Bumper v. North Carolina,'" four police officers went to the house of "a
66-year-old Negro widow... located in a rural area at the end of an
isolated mile-long dirt road."'161 She met the officers at the front door.
Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941) (citing White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940)); White v. Texas, 310 U.S.
530 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
151. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
152. Id. at445-58,475-76.
153. Id. at 467-73.
154. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
155. Id. at 231-32.
156. Id. at 226-27.
157. Id. at 241-48.
158. Id. at 246-49.
159. Under a state's constitution, a state court can adopt a higher standard and require warnings
about the search to be administered for consent to be valid. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58,
62 (1967); Commonwealth v. Walsh, 460 A.2d 767, 771 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
160. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
161. Id. at 546.
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One of them announced, "I have a search warrant to search your house"
she responded, "Go ahead," and opened the door. 62 In the kitchen, the
officers found the rifle that was later introduced in evidence at the trial
of her grandson for rape. The Court reversed the conviction because the
officers had no search warrant. 63 The Court explained: "When a law
enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant,
he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search.
The situation is instinct with coercion-albeit colorably lawful coercion.
Where there is coercion there cannot be consent."'"
Under Bumper, consent to submitting a DNA sample would be invol-
untary if, for instance, the police gave the suspect the impression that
there was no alternative other than to provide the sample. However, on
balance, consent should be deemed sufficient when the police make it
clear that they seek a sample "for criminal investigation purposes"'65 and
avoid statements that could mislead the suspect into believing that there
is a legal duty to furnish the sample when there is none.'66
Furthermore, under Scheckloth, the suspect can protect his or her
privacy by limiting the scope of the consent. In Florida v. Jimeno,167 the
Supreme Court acknowledged that consent to an intrusion may be
limited in scope."' For example, a suspect might authorize the
warrantless search of an automobile but refuse to consent to a search of
the person.'69 By the same token, a suspect could consent to furnishing a
DNA sample only for identification purposes in connection with a
specific investigation. 70 It would be helpful if police obtained written or
162. Id.
163. Id. at 548-50.
164. Id. at 550.
165. Commonwealth v. Walsh, 460 A.2d 767, 773 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); see also State v.
Bailey, 417 A.2d 915, 919 (R.I. 1980) ("The notion of a free and voluntary consent necessarily
implies that the person knows what it is he is allowing the police to do."). It has been held that it is
not necessary to inform a suspect of the specific investigations for which the sample is desired.
Pace v. State, 524 S.E.2d 490, 497-98 (Ga. 1999).
166. People v. Cardenas, 604 N.E.2d 953, 956 (I1. App. Ct. 1992) (holding consent to be
involuntary when the officer created the false impression that there could be a search without the
suspect's consent).
167. 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
168. Id. at 251.
169. See Strong v. United States, 46 F.2d 257, 259 (1st Cir. 193 1); Witt v. Commonwealth, 293
S.W. 1072, 1073 (Ky. 1927); State v. Johnson, 71 Wash. 2d 239, 427 P.2d 705 (1967).
170. Where the individual does not state that the oni, use of the sample is to be in connection
with a specific investigation, police may be tempted to reuse the information in a subsequent
investigation. Indeed, they may even acquire a sample ostensibly for one investigation when their
Vol. 76:413, 2001
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recorded consent for DNA sampling, but there does not appear to be any
constitutional requirement to do so."'
2. Geographic Screening
Some European countries have solved difficult murder cases by
appealing to all local residents to submit to DNA testing. 72 In perhaps
the largest such geographic screening, 16,400 men in western Germany
were tested in the hunt for an eleven-year-old girl's killer."73 A thirty-
year-old man arrested after his DNA was found to match confessed to
raping, stabbing, and killing the girl, as well as to raping another eleven-
year-old girl. 74 In the United Kingdom alone, police have conducted 118
such "mass screens," resulting in forty-eight hits and seven
convictions."5
actual intent is to use it in another. For instance, in Washington v. State, 653 So. 2d 362, 363 (Fla.
1994), a ninety-three-year-old woman was murdered in her bedroom. She had been badly beaten
and vaginally and anally raped. Id. Anthony Washington was imprisoned at a work-release center
two miles from the woman's home. Id. He did not show up at his job during the time of the rape,
and he sold the woman's gold watch to a coworker. Id. The detective investigating the murder did
not tell Washington that he suspected him of this murder. Id. Instead, he asked Washington for
blood and hair samples to use in an unrelated sexual battery case. Id. at 364. Washington provided
these samples. Id. When the state sought to use the samples in the murder case, Washington moved
to suppress them. Id. The trial court denied the motion, and Washington was convicted of the
murder, burglary, and sexual battery. Id. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the conviction,
reasoning: "Washington stated he understood his rights, orally waived them, and freely and
voluntarily provided [the detective] with hair and blood samples. [O]nce the samples were validly
obtained, albeit in an unrelated case, the police were not restrained from using the samples as
evidence in the murder case." Id. Applied to situations in which it is reasonably clear that the DNA
donor meant to consent to only one use, additional uses of the sample may be problematic. The
better rule here might be to presume that consent does not extend beyond the specific investigation
called to the donor's attention. Examples of such consent forms are included in CECELIA CROUSE&
D.H. KAYE, THE RETENTION AND SUBSEQUENT USE OF SUSPECT, ELIMINATION, AND VICTIM DNA
SAMPLES OR RECORDS: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF DNA
EVIDENCE (2000).
171. This practice not only would safeguard the suspect's rights, but it also would simplify the
task of a judge ruling on a motion to suppress evidence acquired as a result of the search.
172 See, e.g., Fred Barbash, Crime-Solving by DNA Dragnet; Britain Makes Arrests in Rape
Cases After Thousands of "Voluntary" Neighborhood Tests, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1996, at A21,
available at 1996 WL 3061978; Alex Smith, Village Takes DNA Tests: Breton Men Give Saliva
Samples in Hunt for Cornish Girl's Murderer, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 11, 1997, at 7, available
at 1998 WL 7775322.
173. DNA Evidence Brings Confession, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 31, 1998, at A20, available at
1998 WL 7775322.
174. Id.
175. David Werrett, The Strategic Use of DNA Profiling, Address Before the 18th International
Congress on Forensic Haemogenetics (Aug. 19, 1999). In these investigations, explicit permission
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Geographic screening has been used on a smaller scale in Ann
Arbor, 176 Miami, 7 7 and San Diego. 17 Nothing in the Fourth Amendment
prevents the police from approaching everyone in a community and
asking for their cooperation. The "dragnet" nature of the inquiry is no
obstacle.179 Consensual contact between a police officer and a citizen is
was obtained from the individuals who provided DNA samples, and the samples from people who
are eliminated as possible suspects were destroyed. Id. In late 1999, however, section 64 of the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act was amended to permit the retention and use of DNA samples
and data with a volunteer's written permission. Home Office, Proposals for Revising Legislative
Measures on Fingerprints, Footprints and DNA Samples I I (July 1999).
176. In 1994, Ann Arbor police investigating a series of rapes reportedly collected blood
samples from 160 African-American men in the area. Alice Robinson, DNA ofInnocent Rape
Suspects Will Not be Kept: Ann Arbor Resident Filed Civil Lawsuit that Spurred Ruling, MICH.
DAILY ONLINE (Nov. 21, 1997), at www.pub.umich.edu/daily/1997/nov/l 1-21-97/news/
newsl2.html (last visited Mar. 26,2001).
177. See Philip P. Pan, Pr. George's Chief Has Used Serial Testing Bqfore; Farrell Oversaw
DNA Sampling of 2,300 in Fla., WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1998, at B I (reporting that for "over two
months, [Miami] police" searching for the Tamiami Strangler, a man who had been murdering
prostitutes, "stopped about 2,300 men driving through an area known for prostitution [along the
Tamiami Trail], asked them to voluntarily provide saliva samples," and "followed up on everybody
who was a preliminary match and everybody who refused to consent voluntarily"). This effort did
not unearth the murderer. He was found after he left a thirty-year-old prostitute in his apartment,
naked, bound with duct tape, and screaming for help. DNA testing of a sample from this woman
matched that of five of the previous murder-rapes. See Lynn Carrillo, Suspect Fit Serial Killer
Portrait: DNA Link to Prostitutes Helps Bolster Case, But Man's Neighbors Stunned, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), June 28, 1995, at lB.
178. The San Diego police department "tested about 800 men during its search for a serial killer
who stabbed six women to death in their homes between January and September 1990." As
described in Pan, supra note 177, at B 1:
[P]olice canvassed neighborhoods around the crime scenes and asked men matching a general
description of a dark-skinned male provided by a witness to voluntarily provide blood or saliva
samples ....
The killer, a 23-year-old laborer named Cleophus Prince now on death row, declined along
with several other men to provide a sample. He later was arrested for breaking into another
woman's home and agreed to provide a DNA sample-which matched evidence found at one
of the murder scenes.
Id.
In Prince George's County, Maryland, police collected samples from at least fifty male
"maintenance men, vendors, nurses and doctors" associated with a hospital in which a fifty-year-
old nursing administrator was raped and killed in an office. See Richard Willing, Privacy Issue Is
the Catch for Police DNA 'Dragnets, 'USA TODAY, Sept. 16, 1998, at IA.
179. Cf United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1,9 (1973) (finding no infirmity in issuing, without
probable cause, grand jury subpoenas to twenty men to secure voice exemplars from them); Davis
v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (containing no suggestion that the compulsory fingerprinting
of twenty-four young men was unconstitutional merely because there was no reason other than
their fitting the very general description provided by the victim).
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neither a search nor a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 80 As a legal
matter, police may ask anyone to give DNA and, as long as they do not
engage in coercion or misrepresentation, the police may collect
voluntary samples for analysis. 8 ' The practice seems less likely to be
effective in this country, however, because the number of residents who
could choose not to cooperate might be larger. In addition, the drain on
police resources in creating what is, in effect, an ad hoe database would
be excessive.'82
E. Inferring Physical Characteristics from Crime-Scene Samples
To help trace the flow of human populations, geneticists and anthro-
pologists have located genetic markers8 3 that help distinguish among
ancestral populations, and various genes or other DNA sequences are
known to have alleles that occur predominantly in certain racial or
ethnic groups.'84 In addition, genetic typing permits inferences as to
180. Cf Davis, 394 U.S. at 727 n.6 (referring to "the settled principle that while the police have
the right to request citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have
no right to compel them to answer").
181. See supra Part I.D.I. For a description of tactics that may have crossed the line from
consent to coercion, see Fred W. Drobner, Comment, DNA Dragnets: Constitutional Aspects of
Mass DNA Identification Testing, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 479, 505-06 (2000).
182. It would be possible to retain the samples of volunteers for possible later use, given
adequate consent. The constitutionality of establishing more permanent, population-wide databases
is addressed in Kaye & Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at III.C.2.
183. Human DNA is packaged into twenty-three pairs of chromosomes in cell nuclei. The DNA
molecules in the chromosomes are composed of four types of units called "nucleotide base pairs."
On average, a chromosome is on the order of 100 million base-pairs long. A "locus" is a location
on a chromosome. Some loci involve sequences that are, in effect, instructions for manufacturing
specific proteins. These are known as genes. Other loci are not involved in the production of any
proteins, and hence, do not produce any observable traits (such as blood types). The distinct
variations at the loci that code for proteins-the genes-are known as alleles of those genes. For
example, the gene for red blood cell types has four major alleles. By extension, the variations in the
order or number of base pairs at the noncoding loci are called DNA alleles. See, e.g., Kaye &
Sensabaugh, supra note 9, at 491.
Although some 99.9% of the sequence of base-pairs are identical among individuals, some do
exhibit substantial variation from one person to another. Id. Among these alleles is a class known
as "short tandem repeats," or STRs. These noncoding regions vary in length. Id. at 494. The
shortest have only one or two sets of a specific DNA sequence that is itself between two to seven
base pairs long, but the typical STR allele has enough repetitions of the core sequence so that it is
50 to 350 base pairs long. Id. at 494 n.38. STRs probably are the most widely used system of
alleles for forensic DNA identification. See id at 494.
184. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC
DNA TESTING: PREDICTIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP 60-61
(2000) [hereinafter NCFDNA]; Kelly Owens & Mary-Claire King, Genomic Views of Human
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inherited disorders and may offer clues to facial or other bodily
features.'85 Learning that the person whose DNA was found at a crime
scene might have such physical characteristics could well be useful in
some criminal investigations.
DNA analysis to conduct such "physical profiling" poses few
constitutional problems. The principal issue arises under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Normally, the
government is free to draw whatever reasonable lines it wishes in
adopting and enforcing the law. The Internal Revenue Service, for
instance, can choose to concentrate its investigations of tax evasion on
higher-income taxpayers. Some classifications, however, are suspect.
86
Race is the prototypical example.'87 Imposing the death sentence on the
killers of whites but not blacks would be impermissible; 18  likewise, a
police officer who adopted a policy of arresting only African-Americans
would be depriving those citizens of the equal protection of the law.'89
Does the fact that race is a suspect classification prohibit the government
History, 286 SCIENCE 451 (1999); M. Klintschar et al., Is It Possible to Determine the Ethnic
Origin of Caucasian Individuals Using Short Tandem Repeat Loci?, in ABSTRACTS OF THE
EIGHTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR FORENSIC
HAEMOGENETICS 63 (1999) ("[l]t is possible to differentiate between major ethnic groups using
forensically relevant short tandem repeat loci.").
185. See. e.g., NCFDNA, supra note 184, at 61 ("[D]etermining that a DNA sample was left by
a person with red hair, dark skin pigment, straight hair, baldness, or color blindness may be
practical soon, if not already."; I M. McCulley et al., Genes and Faces: Classification of Midline
Features, in ABSTRACTS OF THE EIGHTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY FOR FORENSIC HAEMOGENETICS 109 (1999).
186. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Laws or other state actions
that distribute burdens or benefits according to "suspect" classifications are usually, but not
invariably, unconstitutional. Id. (finding a compelling government interest in confining Japanese-
Americans during World War II). The government bears an extremely heavy burden of showing
that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. See, e.g., In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973).
187. Certain other classifications, such as gender, are "quasi-suspect." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976). Their use can be justified by a showing of a close enough connection to an important
state interest. Id. The sex of the source of a biological sample from a crime scene can be
ascertained with far greater confidence than can the race of the source. Although this Article does
not discuss the use of genetic tests for inferring gender in criminal investigations, the analysis of
the constitutionality of testing for race is applicable to testing for sex as well.
188. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.8 (1987) ("It would violate the Equal
Protection Clause for a State to base enforcement of its criminal laws on an unjustifiable standard
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.") (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
189. Cf Hall v. Pa. State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1978) (reasoning that allegations
that the state police directed banks to photograph only blacks entering the banks stated a violation
of equal protection).
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from conducting or funding research to develop or refme genetic
markers for racial identification? Or, when it appears from such markers
that the source of the crime-scene DNA is likely to belong to a particular
racial or ethnic group, does the Equal Protection Clause prohibit the
police from using that fact as an investigative lead and focusing on
members of that group?
These questions require an examination of the purpose and impact of
the racial classification. That race is a suspect classification does not
mean that the government never can inquire into race.' To the contrary,
the collection and analysis of information about race are commonplace
in enforcing the law and in criminological research undertaken or funded
by the government.' 9' More generally, a great deal of social science and
medical research supported or conducted by the government involves the
collection of data on race and the analysis of race as a variable of
interest.'92 Likewise, if using physical evidence of race to focus an
investigation were impermissible, police could not rely on an
eyewitness's report that a person fleeing the scene of a crime was
Hispanic, on a victim's report that a rapist was white, or on a linguist's
analysis of accent or word choice in a recorded death threat that
suggested that the caller was African-American. 93 These reports could
be in error in any given case, but if they are generally accurate, paying
attention to them is not unconstitutional. 194
190. For that matter, even race-conscious affirmative-action programs can sometimes be upheld.
Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730 (6th Cir. 2000), cert denied, 121
S. Ct. 1089 (2001); Walker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. 1999), cert denied, 528
U.S. 1131 (2000).
191. See, e.g., THOMAS P. BONCZAR & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
LIFETIME LIKELIHOOD OF GOING TO STATE OF FEDERAL PRISONS (1997).
192. See, e.g., NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 1999,
WITH HEALTH AND AGING CHARTBOOK tbl.49 (1999), available at http:llwww.cdc.gov/
nchs/rd.htm (last visited Apr. 30,2001).
193. Testimony as to ethnic and racial identifications routinely is admitted in criminal trials. See,
e.g., United States v. Card, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 116-19 (D. Utah 2000) (reviewing cases on
admissibility of lay testimony of race or ethnicity based on speech patterns).
194. There are few cases on the constitutionality of using race as an identifying feature in
criminal investigations, presumably because the validity of the practice always has been taken for
granted. See, e.g., Waldron v. United States, 206 F.3d 597, 604 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that an
investigative stop of a bank robber that relied in part on witnesses' statements as to the robber's
race was not "illegal 'racial targeting' or 'racial profiling' because '[c]ommon sense dictates that,
when determining whom to approach as a suspect of criminal wrongdoing, a police officer may
legitimately consider race as a factor if descriptions of the perpetrator known to the officer include
race"). In Hall, the Third Circuit held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the police from
asking banks to photograph suspicious-looking blacks who entered their establishments. Hall, 570
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The government can rely on racial information in a criminal
investigation because the practice does not unfairly burden any racial
group.'9 5 In cases in which racial classifications have been struck down,
the explicit purpose or actual use of the racial classification was to
burden or stigmatize a racial group. Yick Wo v. Hopkins'96 offers an early
illustration. In 1880, San Francisco passed an ordinance requiring that
persons obtain a permit before operating laundries in wooden structures.
Yick Wo was convicted of operating such a laundry without a permit.
The Supreme Court set aside the conviction because it concluded that
city officials had issued permits with "an evil eye and an unequal
hand."'9 7 Almost without exception, permits were denied to Chinese and
granted to non-Chinese.' Thus, the permit requirement, although not
explicitly racial, was used to exclude the Chinese from the laundry
business. It burdened this group for no legitimate reason.
A different question is presented when racial information is collected
and used evenhandedly to advance legitimate state interests and in ways
that are not designed to disadvantage any individual because of race. In
these situations, courts have held the government can record the racial
F.2d at 90-91. The constitutional infirmity in this practice, the court reasoned, was that "[tihe
police simply instituted a general photographic survey limited to one race." Id. at 91. The court
indicated that the result would have been otherwise had the practice applied to all races, or had the
request been part of an investigation of a crime by a black suspect: "This is not a situation where
suspects are being sought on the basis of descriptions which include race as well as other physical
characteristics. No crime was under investigation nor was there any information that a robbery was
planned." 1d.
195. Cf Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (stating that the Fourteenth
Amendment confers "the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against [a group]
distinctively" on account of race). The continuing vitality of Strauder cannot be doubted. See, e.g.,
J.E.B. v. T.V., 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42,44 (1992); Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991). Consider also the use of racial information by government doctors
on the staff of Veterans Administration hospitals. Suppose that a physician who is considering
administering the drug isoniazid to an Asian patient who is either has pulmonary sarcoidosis or
pulmonary tuberculosis. See Richard I. Kopelman et al., Clinical Problem Solving: A Little Math
Helps the Medicine Go Down, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 435 (1999). Although this therapy improves
the chance of survival for tuberculosis (but not sarcoidosis), it can lead to hepatitis. Id. at 437. The
risk of this complication is about twice as large in Asian men as in other men. Id. In weighing the
therapeutic benefits against the risks it would be medically inadvisable for the physician to
disregard the fact that the patient is Asian. See id. at 437-38. Therefore, it is legal for the physician
to use race as a factor in diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment.
196. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
197. Id. at 373-74.
198. See id.
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information. For instance, Hamm v. Virginia State Board of Elections99
involved an equal protection challenge to a Virginia law that required
every decree of divorce to recite the race of the spouses. A three-judge
district court upheld this record-keeping provision because the racial
information served the valid purpose of collecting social statistics and
did not single out or burden any racial group."0 The Supreme Court
affirmed without discussion.01
Under these principles, governmental sponsorship of research on the
variations of particular alleles across races and the investigative use of
alleles that are reasonably accurate indicators of race should pass
constitutional muster. Two factors are crucial to such constitutionality:
No group is singled out for special treatment, and no one is penalized
because of hostility toward race.02 If the police make investigative use
199. 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va.), afd sub nom. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (per
curiam).
200. The court wrote:
mhe designation of race, just as sex or religious denomination, may in certain records serve a
useful purpose, and the procurement and compilation of such information by State authorities
cannot be outlawed per se. For example, the securing and chronicling of racial data for
identification or statistical use violates no constitutional privilege. If the purpose is legitimate,
the reason justifiable, then no infringement results ....
Vital statistics, obviously, are aided by denotation in the divorce decrees of the race of the
parties. This provision ... is not objectionable in law. Of course, the advertence must be made
in every case, not just in suits involving Negroes.
Id. at 158. Other laws required lists of qualified voters and property owners to be maintained so as
to reveal the race of the individuals. The court struck down these requirements because "they serve
no other purpose than to classify and distinguish official records on the basis of race or color." Id.
201. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (per curiam).
202. Where the government publicizes the race of individuals in a way calculated to
disadvantage members of certain racial groups, it offends the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, in
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964), individuals wishing to become candidates in an election
to the county school board of East Baton, Louisiana, brought an action to enjoin the state from
enforcing a statute that required nomination papers and ballots to designate the race of candidates
for elective office. Id. at 401. On its face, the law applied to all races and was applied
evenhandedly. Nonetheless, its only plausible purpose was to invite racial cohesion in elections. As
the Court explained:
[B]y directing the citizen's attention to the single consideration of race or color, the State
indicates that a candidate's race or color is an important-perhaps paramount-consideration
in the citizen's choice, which may decisively influence the citizen to cast his ballot along racial
lines. Hence in a State or voting district where Negroes predominate, that race is likely to be
favored by a racial designation on the ballot, while in those communities where other races are
in the majority, they may be preferred. The vice lies not in the resulting injury but in the
placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification that induces racial prejudice at
the polls.
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of racial information whenever that information is useful, then all racial
groups are treated alike; none is stigmatized or disadvantaged in the
enforcement of laws that apply with equal force to members of every
race.
It is true that the information could have a disparate impact and lead
to the apprehension of more criminals from one race than another-but
not because of official (or even unofficial) hostility toward particular
races or individual prejudices about those races. Recent years have
witnessed outcries against "racial profiling" in policing.2 °3 The
constitutional defect in this practice is that authorities unfairly target
minorities for traffic stops or arrests. As in Yick Wo, laws that are neutral
on their face-that do not explicitly classify people by race-can be
applied disproportionately to racial minorities.2° With DNA samples
from crime scenes, however, statistically valid inferences as to race
Id. at 402.
The use of race as an identifying feature in criminal investigations is quite different. It is not
designed to induce or capitalize on racial prejudice, but rather serves the legitimate purpose of
enabling authorities to identify and apprehend the perpetrators of crimes. Moreover, as discussed in
the text below, the use of DNA markers could serve to reduce the operation of racial prejudice by
providing an objective indication of the race of the perpetrator.
These benign characteristics are present even if the DNA genotypes associated with race
distinguish among but a handful of races. For example, suppose (unrealistically) that only two
groups could be distinguished with reasonable accuracy-individuals of African descent and those
of European descent. Deciding that the crime samples in one set of cases probably originated from
one group, while those in another set of cases probably came from the other group, would represent
an evenhanded application of the available information to all people. It is comparable to using
black-and-white surveillance videos of bank robberies. As long as the police consistently focus
investigations on individuals with the complexion of those depicted on film, they do not
purposefully disadvantage any one group, and the practice would not constitute the invidious
discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause.
203. See Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 20, 1999, at 51;
Jerry Gray, Unvelcome Addition to a Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1999, at A5; Steven A. Holmes,
Clinton Orders Investigation on Possible Racial Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1999, at A22;
Steve Miller, Ashcroft Demands Profiling Study,: Gives Congress Six Months or Says He Will Do It
Himself, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4147940.
204. This risk can be intolerably high when race is itself the factor on which officers rely.
Consequently, the Equal Protection Clause may require the use of factors-gang membership, for
example-that are not explicitly racial, even though these factors can be highly correlated with
race. It is well settled that the use of valid decision-making factors does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause even when they have a disparate impact on one race. Hunt v. Crowmartie, 526
U.S. 541, 546 (1999) ("A facially neutral law, on the other hand, warrants strict scrutiny only if it
can be proved that the law was motivated by a racial purpose or object, or if it is unexplainable on
grounds other than race.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976). When the underlying, nonracial factors are available, they are more accurate
indicators than the racial surrogate for them.
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cannot lead the authorities to target minorities because of subjective
racial stereotypes or prejudices.0 5 If anything, by focusing the
investigation on the pertinent physical characteristics-whatever they
may be-reliance on genetic information in crime-scene samples could
correct any tendency to pursue one racial group exclusively or
disproportionately. For example, if DNA analysis indicated that the
source of a sample was more likely to be Caucasian than African-
American, it might help overcome a stereotypical assumption that only
blacks need be considered as prime suspects. By providing objective
information, DNA analysis could serve as an antidote to the
objectionable form of "racial profiling" in police work.
Of course, this is not to say that the government should institute a
research program to develop more precise DNA markers for racial
identity or that police should use existing markers that are demonstrated
to be informative as to race. The conclusion is simply that these are
policy choices to be made about a developing technology-these options
are not foreclosed by the Constitution.
II. DNA ANALYSIS IN PROSECUTIONS
A. Standards and Procedures for Deciding Admissibility
1. Novel Scientific Methods
Two major standards exist for deciding whether scientific findings
will be admitted into evidence: the "general-acceptance" test and the
"sound-methodology" standard.0 6 If a timely objection is raised, the
judge must determine whether the applicable standard has been met. The
general-acceptance standard was first articulated in an influential 1923
federal court of appeals case, Frye v. United States."7 In jurisdictions
that follow Frye, the proponent of the scientific evidence typically must
establish that the underlying theory and methodology are generally
accepted within the relevant portions of the scientific community.
The sound-methodology standard is derived from phrases in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
205. By "racial information," this Article is simply referring to genetic markers that are far more
common within one "racial group" than another.
206. The description of these standards is drawn from NRC 11, supra note 1, at 171-73.
207. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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InC.,208 the U.S. Supreme Court held that these rules implicitly jettison
general acceptance as an absolute prerequisite to the admissibility of
scientific evidence.0 9 Instead of the Frye test, the Court prescribed a
broader framework for deciding whether proposed testimony has
sufficient scientific validity and reliability to be admitted as relevant
"scientific knowledge" that would "assist the trier of fact. 2t0 In that
framework, the lack of general acceptance weighs against admissibility
but is not invariably fatal. It is circumstantial evidence that the
technology has not been studied widely or that the bulk of the specialists
who have studied the technique have found it wanting. The Court
discussed other factors that might be considered. Its nonexhaustive list
includes the extent to which the theory and technology have been tested,
the existence of a body of peer-reviewed studies, and the known error
rates of the procedure.2 ' Although the trend in the states appears to be
toward the Daubert view,212 there still are jurisdictions that adhere to
Frye.21
3
Labels like "general acceptance" and "sound methodology" are just
that-labels. Cases decided in each jurisdiction help to define the
scientific community in which the degree of scientific acceptance is to
be ascertained, the extent of disagreement that can be tolerated, the
information that may be used to gauge the extent of consensus, and the
specific factors other than general acceptance that bear on relevance and
helpfulness. The degree of scientific consensus is important to the
admissibility of scientific evidence in all jurisdictions, and pretrial
hearings in hotly contested cases have lasted months and generated
thousands of pages of testimony probing the opinions of experts on
various aspects of DNA profiling. The courts have examined affidavits
or testimony from scientists selected by the parties, specific papers in
208. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
209. Id. at 589.
210. Id. at 592.
211. Id. at 593-94.
212. Heather G. Hamilton, Note, The Movement from Frye to Daubert: Where Do the States
Stand?, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 209 (1998) (noting that by December 15, 1997, thirty-three states
had adopted the Daubert standard).
213. See, e.g., Logerquist v. McVey, I P.3d 113, 124-33 (Ariz. 2000); People v. Leahy, 882
P.2d 321, 323 (Cal. 1994); Murray v. State, 692 So. 2d 157, 161 (Fla. 1997); People v. Miller, 670
N.E.2d 721, 731 (Ill. 1996); People v. Wernick, 674 N.E.2d 322, 324-24 (N.Y. 1996);
Commonwealth v. Blasioli, 713 A.2d 1117, 1119 (Pa. 1998); State v. Copeland, 130 Wash. 2d 244,
262, 922 P.2d 1304, 1315 (1996).
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scientific periodicals, the writings of science journalists, the body of
court opinions, and other scientific and legal literature.
In particular, the history of the judicial treatment of DNA evidence
can be divided into at least five phases.21a The first phase was one of
rapid and sometimes uncritical acceptance. The first generation of DNA
typing tests examined certain Restriction Fragment Length Polymor-
phisms (RFLPs) known as Variable Number Tandem Repeats (VNTRs).
Bacterial "restriction enzymes" can be used to cut the strands of the
DNA molecule when they encounter certain, short sequences of bases
("restriction sites").215 The resulting fragments vary in their lengths;
some have more base pairs between two adjacent restriction sites. One
class of such length polymorphisms is due to repetitions of "core
sequences" some fifteen to thirty-five base pairs long.216 These core
sequences are repeated end-to-end different numbers of times in
different individuals. Because of the many repeats, these VNTR alleles
typically extend for thousands of bases." 7 Between each pair of
restriction sites, an individual usually has two fragments of distinct
lengths (one from each chromosome). The two lengths can be measured
by electrophoresis, a process that sorts fragments by length.1 8
Initial praise for RFLP testing in homicide, rape, paternity, and other
cases was effusive. Indeed, one judge proclaimed "DNA fingerprinting"
to be "the single greatest advance in the 'search for truth' ... since the
advent of cross-examination."2 9 In this first wave of cases, expert
testimony for the prosecution rarely was countered, and courts readily
admitted RFLP findings.22°
214. This history of the judicial reception of DNA evidence is adapted from I CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 205 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
215. The nucleotide bases that connect the two helical strands of the DNA molecule often are
referred to by the first letters (A, T, C, and G) of their names. The A on one strand always pairs
with the T on another, and the C with a G, so that the base pairs are like a spiral staircase with four
types of rungs (AT, TA, CG, GC). See, e.g., Kaye & Sensabaugh, supra note 9, at 560. The bonds
between the bases are weak, however, and the two strands can be separated by heating or
chemicals. When a restriction enzyme is applied to the single-stranded DNA, it cuts the strand at
sites that are several base pairs long. See, e.g., D.H. Kaye, Bible Reading: DNA Evidence in
Arizona, 28 ARiZ. ST. LJ. 1035, 1044-45 (1996).
216. See, e.g., Kaye & Sensabaugh, supra note 9, at 494.
217. See id. at 562.
218. See, e.g.,id at 501.
219. People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (County Ct. 1988).
220. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 847-51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Wesley, 533
N.Y.S.2d at 643-59; State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253, 259-62 (W. Va. 1989) (taking judicial
notice of general scientific acceptance where there was no expert testimony, but holding that
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In a second wave of cases, however, defendants pointed to problems
at two levels-controlling the experimental conditions of the analysis
and interpreting the results. 221 Some scientists questioned certain
features of the procedures for extracting and analyzing DNA employed
in forensic laboratories. It became apparent that determining whether
RFLPs in VNTR loci in two samples actually match can be complicated
by measurement variability 2 2 or missing or spurious bands.22 ' Despite
these concerns, most cases continued to find forensic RFLP analyses to
be generally accepted,224 and a number of states have provided for
admissibility of DNA tests by legislation. 25 Concerted attacks by
inconclusive results were properly excluded as irrelevant); Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation,
Admissibility of DNA Identification Evidence, 84 A.L.R.4th 313 (1991).
221. For a comprehensive survey of possible sources of error and ambiguity in VNTR profiling,
see William Thompson & Simon Ford, The Meaning of a Match: Sources of Ambiguity in the
Interpretation of DNA Prints, in FORENSIC DNA TECHNOLOGY 93 (Mark A. Farley & James J.
Harrington eds., 1990).
222. Electrophoresis involves the application of an electric field that pulls shorter fragments
through a gelatinous material more rapidly than longer fragments. Thus, in a fixed time, shorter
alleles run farther on the "gel," as it is called, than the longer fragments. But the separation process
is not exact. Two fragments that are very close in size may not be distinguishable, and the distance
that a fragment travels varies slightly from one run to the next. Because of this measurement error
inherent in the system the lengths are not known precisely. See, e.g., NRC 1I, supra note I, at 139-
42.
223. When the many copies of single-stranded DNA fragments extracted from a sample of many
cells have been separated on the electrophoretic gel, they are transferred to a sheet of nylon that is
easier to manage. The restriction fragments of interest are identified with a "probe"-a short stretch
of single-stranded DNA that binds to the core sequence of the desired fragments. The probe
includes a radioactive or chemical "tag" that "lights up" to mark the fragments to which it is bound.
For example, if a nylon membrane with radioactively tagged fragments is placed next to sheets of
suitable photographic film, the radiation will expose the film in two separate "bands" adjacent to
the two regions where fragments of the two lengths have migrated. See, e.g., Kaye & Sensabaugh,
supra note 9, at 501-02. But laboratory artifacts or contamination can produce extra bands or
missing bands. See, e.g., United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991), a/T'd sub nom.
United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993); Christopher Anderson, DNA Fingerprinting
on Trial, 342 NATURE 844 (1989); William Thompson & Simon Ford, Is DNA Fingerprinting
Ready for the Courts?, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 31, 1990, at 38; Kolata, supra note 2.
224. See, e.g., Yee, 134 F.R.D. at 166-67; State v. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847, 852-54 (N.C.
1990) (accepting uncontradicted expert testimony that false positives are impossible); Glover v.
State, 787 S.W.2d 544, 548 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (finding analysis admissible in light of other
decisions where "[a]ppellant did not produce any expert testimony").
225. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-915 (1998) ("In any criminal proceeding, the
evidence of a DNA profile is admissible to prove or disprove the identity of any person."); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 634.25 (West Supp. 2001) The statute states:
In a ... criminal trial or hearing, the results of DNA analysis ... are admissible in evidence
without antecedent expert testimony that DNA analysis provides a trustworthy and reliable
method of identifying characteristics in an individual's genetic material upon a showing that
the offered testimony meets the standards for admissibility set forth in the Rules of Evidence.
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defense experts of impeccable credentials, however, produced a few
cases rejecting specific proffers on the ground that the testing procedure
was not sufficiently rigorous.226 Moreover, a minority of courts, perhaps
concerned that DNA evidence might well be conclusive in the minds of
jurors, added a "third prong" to the general acceptance standard.2 27 This
augmented Frye test requires not only proof of the general acceptance of
the ability of science to produce the type of results offered in court, but
also a showing of the proper application of an approved method on the
particular occasion."' Whether this inquiry is properly part of the special
screening of scientific methodology, however, is debatable.2
Id.; see also Kenneth E. Melson, Legal and Ethical Considerations, in DNA FINGERPRINTING: AN
INTRODUCTION 189, 199-200 (Lame T. Kirby ed., 1990).
226. See State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn. 1989) (recognizing that "DNA typing
has gained general acceptance in the scientific community," but "the laboratory in this case did not
comport" with "appropriate standards"); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 996 (Sup. Ct. 1989)
(stating that principles of DNA testing have been generally accepted, but "[i]n a piercing attack
upon each molecule of evidence presented, the defense was successful in demonstrating to this
court that the testing laboratory failed in its responsibility to perform the accepted scientific
techniques and experiments"); Colin Norman, Maine Case Deals Blow to DNA Fingerprinting, 246
SCIENCE 1556 (1989); Rorie Sherman, DNA Tests Unravel?, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 18, 1989, at 1, 24-
25.
Effective December 1, 2000, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended to require that the
proponent show both the expert used a reliable methodology and the expert "has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case." The Advisory Committee Note states:
The amendment specifically provides that the trial court must scrutinize not only the principles
and methods used by the expert, but also whether those principles and methods have been
properly applied to the facts of the case. As the court noted in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994), "any step that renders the analysis unreliable ...
renders the expert's testimony inadmissible. This is true whether the step completely changes a
reliable methodology or merely misapplies that methodology."
Id. (emphasis in original)
227. This innovation was introduced in Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 995-99. It soon spread. See
United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir. 1990) ("[lit was error for the trial court to
determine the admissibility of the DNA evidence without determining whether the testing
procedures ... were conducted properly."), vacatedfor reh 'g en banc, app. dismissed due to death
of defendant, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991); Exparte Perry, 586 So. 2d 242, 248 (Ala. 1991). For
cases declining to graft a "Third prong" onto Frye, see, for example, State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152,
1179-84 (Ariz. 1993); Hopkins v. State, 579 N.E. 2d 1297, 1302-04 (Ind. 1991); State v.
Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 490 (N.H. 1992); State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d 879, 888-90, 846
P.2d 502,505-07 (1993).
228. Later, some courts insisted on such a showing as part of the demonstration of scientific
soundness required under Daubert. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1197-99 (8th
Cir. 1993).
229. For an analysis concluding that such matters are better handled, not as part of the special
test for scientific evidence, but as aspects of the balancing of probative value and prejudice, see
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A different attack on DNA profiling that began in cases during this
period proved far more successful and led to a third wave of cases. Even
if the laboratory has found the true VNTR profile in the sample and has
correctly determined that it matches the defendant's, there is some
chance that the match is a coincidence because the perpetrator actually
was someone else whose VNTR profile happens to be the same as the
defendant's. To dismiss this possibility as remote, prosecutors called on
experts to testify that the probability of a coincidentally matching VNTR
profile (often called a "random-match probability") is infinitesimal.
However, these estimates relied on a simplified population-genetics
model for the frequencies of VNTR profiles that treats each race as a
large, randomly mating population. Some prominent scientists claimed
that the applicability of the model had not been adequately verified.23
They suggested that within a broad population group such as Cauca-
sians, subgroups such as Italian-Americans and Swedish-Americans tend
to mate among themselves and might have very different frequencies for
the VNTR alleles. Such a population structure could cause the simplified
estimates to understate (or overstate) the profile frequency for
Caucasians derived from data that fail to account for the effects of the
subpopulations. A heated debate spilled over from courthouses to
scientific journals and convinced the supreme courts of several states
that general acceptance was lacking. 3' A 1992 report of the National
Academy of Sciences proposed a more "conservative" computational
method as a compromise,232 and this seemed to undermine the claim of
scientific acceptance of the less conservative procedure that was in
general use.233
At this juncture, the debate was poised to enter a fourth phase. In
response to the population-genetics criticism and the 1992 NAS report 23 4
Margaret A. Berger, Laboratory Error Seen Through the Lens of Science and Policy, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1081 (1997).
230. See Kaye, supra note 217, at 128; Thompson, supra note 5, at 22. In the light of the totality
of information on the distribution of various genes in populations, the criticism of the simple
random-mating model may have been overblown. See Bernard Devlin & Kathryn Roeder, DNA
Profiling: Statistics and Population Genetics, in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 710 (David Faigman et al. eds., 1997).
231. See NRC II, supra note 1, at 205-11 (tabulating cases); Kaye, supra note 5, at 101.
232. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE,
DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992) [hereinafter NRC I].
233. See David H. Kaye, The Forensic Debut of the National Research Council"s DNA Report:
Population Structure, Ceiling Frequencies and the Need for Numbers, 96 GENETICA 99 (1995).
234. NRC I, supra note 232.
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came an outpouring of both critiques of the report and new studies of the
distribution of VNTR alleles in many population groups. Relying on the
burgeoning literature, a second National Academy panel concluded in
1996 that the usual method of estimating frequencies of VNTR profiles
in broad racial groups was sound. 5 In the fourth phase of judicial
scrutiny of DNA evidence, the courts almost invariably returned to the
earlier view that the probabilities estimated with the random-mating
model (or minor variations of it) are generally accepted and
scientifically valid. 1
6
The fifth phase of the judicial evaluation of DNA evidence is well
underway. Harnessing the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) enables
laboratories to produce millions of identical copies of DNA fragments
even from samples too small for RFLP typing. 7 With these in hand,
many DNA polymorphisms can be analyzed quickly and unambig-
uously. 8 Consequently, the RFLP methods "are being rapidly replaced"
with PCR-based methods. 9 As results obtained with new methods enter
the courtroom, it becomes necessary to ask whether each such method
rests on a solid scientific foundation or is generally accepted in the
scientific community.24 Sometimes, the answer will be obvious even
235. NRC II, supra note 1, at 156-59. The 1996 report provides more refined methods for
estimating allele frequencies in ethnic subpopulations.
236. See, e.g., People v. Soto, 981 P.2d 958, 974 (Cal. 1999) ("Several developments since the
filing of Barney indicate the controversy over population substructuring and use of the unmodified
product rule has dissipated."); People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 721, 731-32 (111. 1996) ("[W]hile there
has been some controversy over the use of the product rule in calculating the frequency of a DNA
match, that controversy appears to be dissipating."); Armstead v. State, 673 A.2d 221, 238 (Md.
1996) ("mhe debate over the product rule essentially ended in 1993."); Commonwealth v. Fowler,
685 N.E.2d 746, 748-50 (Mass. 1997) (stating that the product rule with and without ceilings for
VNTRs now meets test of scientific reliability in light of 1996 NRC Report), departing from
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311, 314-17 (Mass. 1992) (reasoning that dispute over
population structure evinces lack ofgeneral acceptance); I MCCORMICKsupra 214, § 205, at 761.
237. See, e.g., Kaye & Sensabaugh, supra note 9, at 563-64.
238. For a description of one such system, see infra note 274.
239. NCFDNA, supra note 184, at 16; see also supra note 183 (describing STRs).
240. See, e.g., Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1251-52 (Ind. 1995) (reversing due to lack of
a Frye hearing on PCR-based method). But see State v. Scott, No. 01CO1-9708-CR-00334, 1999
WL 547460, at *8-10 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 28, 1999) (holding, in unpublished opinion, that
state statute providing that "the results of DNA analysis ... are admissible in evidence without
antecedent expert testimony that DNA analysis provides a trustworthy and reliable method of
identifying characteristics in an individual's genetic material upon a showing that the offered
testimony meets the standards of admissibility set forth in the Tennessee Rules of Evidence
obviated the need for a hearing on the scientific soundness ofmitochondrial DNA testing).
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without an extensive pretrial hearing.21  The opinions are practically
unanimous in holding that the more commonly used PCR-based
procedures satisfy these standards.242
In sum, in little more than a decade, DNA typing has made the
transition from a novel set of methods for identification to a relatively
mature and well studied forensic technology. However, one should not
lump all forms of DNA identification together. New techniques and
applications continue to emerge. These range from the use of new
genetic systems and new analytical procedures to the typing of DNA
from plants and animals.243 Before admitting such evidence, it will be
necessary to inquire into the biological principles and knowledge that
would justify inferences from these new technologies or applications.244
For example, a court's prior approval of RFLP testing by gel
electrophoresis245 or reverse dot blot testing2 46 of PCR-amplified frag-
241. For example, a procedure may be so similar to accepted protocols that acceptance or
validity can be inferred from previous cases. See United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 952-53
(8th Cir. 1995) (holding, in response to a defense expert's testimony that a police department's
variation on the FBI protocol for RFLP-VNTR testing had not been validated, that the variation did
not preclude admission where an FBI analyst testified that the difference was of no significance);
People v. Oliver, 713 N.E.2d 727, 734 (Il1. Ct. App. 1999) ('[T]he minor variations ... in
the.., second RFLP test did not render it a new scientific technique for the purposes of Frye."). In
general, trial courts have considerable "latitude in deciding how to test an expert's reliability, and
to decide whether or when special briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate
reliability." Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) (emphasis in original).
242. People v. Allen, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 658-60 (Ct. App. 1999) (STR testing);
Commonwealth v. Rosier, 685 N.E.2d 739, 741-43 (Mass. 1997) (same); Commonwealth v. Vao
Sok, 683 N.E.2d 671, 672-73 (Mass. 1997) (finding PCR-based DQ, Polymarker, and DIS80
analysis "meet the test of scientific reliability"); State v. Jackson, 582 N.W.2d 317, 325-26 (Neb.
1998) (STR testing); State v. Harvey, 699 A.2d 596, 616-33 (N.J. 1997) (finding DQ and
Polymarker tests generally accepted); State v. Lyons, 924 P.2d 802, 805-16 (Or. 1996) (finding
DQ admissible under relevancy standard); State v. Moeller, 548 N.W.2d 465, 479-84 (S.D. 1996)
(finding DQ admissible under Daubert standard). For descriptions of these tests, see Kaye &
Sensabaugh, supra note 9; NCFDNA, supra note 184. See also supra notes 214-39.
243. George Sensabaugh & D.H. Kaye, Non-human DNA Evidence, 39 JURIMETRICS J. I (1998).
244. For suggestions to assist in this endeavor, see id.; Kaye & Sensabaugh, supra note 9, at
549-59.
245. Gel electrophoresis is described supra notes 222, 223.
246. Reverse dot blot testing "tests for the presence of a specific sequence. The procedure
involves the use of probes specific for that particular DNA sequence. The analyst adds known
probes .... The dot blot test is binary in character; there are only two possible outcomes, and they
indicate whether or not the sequence is present. If the [sequence is present], color will develop; if
the [sequence is absent], no color will develop at the DNA spot .... " 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI &
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 18-3(C), at 18 (3d ed. 1999).
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ments containing the HLA DQ-x gene247 does not dictate the conclusion
that the court also must accept testing at STR loci 248 or mitochondrial
DNA sequencing. 249  The newer technologies are gaining judicial
approval,20 but a court should not confer approval until it is satisfied
that the specific technology satisfies the applicable standard.
2. Proficiency-Test Records
In a study, the researchers empirically verify the ability of the
technology to identify features of DNA molecules. In contrast a
proficiency study tests how competently the laboratory's analysts apply
a technology that has been validated.2 1' The purpose of proficiency
testing is to uncover difficulties that a particular technician or a
particular laboratory might be encountering in applying established
methods.
247. Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) is an "[a]ntigen (foreign body that stimulates an immune
system response) located on the surface of most cells (excluding red blood cells and sperm cells).
HLAs differ among individuals and are associated closely with transplant rejection." Kaye &
Sensabaugh, supra note 9, at 570. DQA is "[t]he gene that codes for a particular class of Human
Leukocyte Antigen (HLA). This gene has been sequenced completely and can be used for forensic
typing." Id. at 568. Indeed, "[t]he first use of PCR-based typing for forensic applica-
tion ... employed the HLA-DQAI locus (formerly called the DQ- )." NCFDNA, supra note 184, at
17.
248. For descriptions of STR loci, see supra note 183; GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note
246, § 18-3(C), at 21.
249. Most DNA-typing techniques analyze DNA found in the chromosomes within cell nuclei.
Mitochondrial testing analyzes DNA "found in the energy-producing material surrounding the cell
nucleus." GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 246, § 18-2, at 3. A mitochondrion is "[a]
structure ... within nucleated... cells that is the site of the energy producing reactions within the
cell. Mitochondria contain their own DNA (often abbreviated as mtDNA), which is inherited only
from mother to child." Kaye & Sensabaugh, supra note 9, at 571. Because there are hundreds of
mitochondria in a cell, but only one nucleus, mtDNA sequencing can be used with samples
containing too little nuclear DNA for PCR amplification to work. Id. at 495.
250. See, e.g., State v. Underwood, 518 S.E.2d 231 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (approving use of
mitochondrial DNA sequencing); State v. Ware, No. 03C01-9705CR00164, 1999 WL 233592
(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 1999) (holding that notwithstanding testimony from a defense expert
that mtDNA sequencing had not been adequately validated for forensic use, the FBI's mtDNA
testing was properly admitted under the scientific soundness standard); see also Leigh Jones,
mtDNA Ruled Reliable in Rape Trial, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 2000; supra note 242.
251. Proficiency testing in forensic genetic testing is designed to ascertain whether an analyst
can correctly determine genetic types in a sample the origin of which is unknown to the analyst but
is known to a tester. Proficiency is demonstrated by making correct genetic typing determinations
in repeated trials, and not by opining on whether the sample originated from a particular individual.
Proficiency tests also require laboratories to report random-match probabilities to determine if
proper calculations are being made. See Kaye & Sensabaugh, supra note 9, at 511.
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Proficiency testing raises a variety of legal issues. It has been
suggested that participation in a program of proficiency testing ought to
be a prerequisite to the admission of evidence from a forensic
laboratory, 252 that proficiency-test results should be admissible to show
how likely it is that the laboratory erred in the test at bar,253 and that
random-match probabilities ought to be inadmissible unless they are
combined with proficiency-test results to estimate the probability of a
false match. If the second suggestion is followed, and the defense is
allowed to introduce evidence of proficiency tests to suggest that the
laboratory is prone to err, a further question arises: Should the prose-
cution be permitted to present testimony that the defense has not retested
or even requested the opportunity to retest the samples?25
4
a. Proficiency Testing As a Prerequisite to Admission
The first suggestion, that courts condition admissibility on
proficiency testing, is a departure from the usual practice. As indicated
in the previous section, the scientific-validity and general-acceptance
standards relate to the capacity of an analytical procedure to generate
accurate results when properly applied, and not to whether the individual
or institution using a valid or generally accepted method is skilled and
careful or is instead careless and prone to error.25 Of course, the latter
issue can be of paramount importance, but usually it is said to be a
matter affecting the weight of the evidence rather than its admissi-
bility. 256
252. See, e.g., Barry C. Scheck, DNA and Daubert, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1959, 1979-87 (1994);
William C. Thompson, Accepting Lower Standards: The National Research Council's Second
Report on Forensic DNA Evidence, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 405, 417 (1997).
253. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA
Evidence at Trial, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 21, 37-38 (1993); Scheck, supra note 252, at 1984 n.93.
254. Cf James Wooley & Rockne P. Harmon, The Forensic DNA Brouhaha: Science or
Debate?, 51 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1164 (1992) (urging defense experts who criticize laboratory
procedures to do their own tests).
255. See United States v. Shea, 957 F. Supp. 331, 340-41 (D.N.H. 1997).
256. See Edward J. lmwinkelried, The Case Against Evidentiary Admissibility Standards that
Attempt to "Freeze" the State of a Scientific Technique, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 887 (1996). In
extreme cases, where the laboratory departs so grossly from accepted practices that the reliability
of its findings are in serious doubt, the court may well exclude the evidence on the ground that its
probative value is too slight to warrant its admission.
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b. The Admissibility ofErrors on Proficiency Tests
The second suggestion, that testimony about proficiency-test results
be used to reveal the chance of error in the case at bar, presupposes that
such evidence is admissible at trial. 7 In its 1992 report, a committee of
the National Academy of Sciences took the position that "laboratory
error rates must be continually estimated in blind proficiency testing and
must be disclosed to juries." '  There is authority that when the prose-
cution introduces testimony about the probability of a coincidentally
matching profile, the defendant is entitled to introduce testimony about
the laboratory's proficiency tests.29 Indeed, it has been held that the
opponent must be allowed to cross-examine one laboratory
representative about errors committed by other analysts at the labora-
tory.2 °
In contrast, in a report published in 1996, a second committee of the
National Academy of Sciences declined to take a position on whether
evidence of laboratory error rates, as estimated from proficiency studies,
should be admissible at trial.26' However, the report's discussion of
proficiency testing raises questions about the probative value of such
evidence. For example, the report notes that "[t]he pooling of
proficiency-test results across laboratories" could mislead a jury and
"penalize the better laboratories.' 62 It adds that even a test of the same
laboratory might be outdated, because the laboratory may have taken
257. The discussion of admissibility in this section is limited to the guilt phase of a case. In
many jurisdictions, the formal rules of evidence are not binding during the sentencing phase. See,
e.g., FED. R. EVID. I 101(d)(3). Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that during the
sentencing stage of a capital case, the Constitution requires the sentencer to "consider[], as a
mitigating factor, any [logically relevant] aspect for a defendant's character or record and any of
the circumstances of the offense that the defense proffers as a basis of a sentence less than death."
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis in original). Although the past performance
of the laboratory is neither an aspect of a defendant's character or record nor a circumstance of the
offense, a capital defendant might argue that the sentencer also must be able to consider all
conceivable weaknesses in the state's proof of the offense.
258. NRC I, supra note 232, at 89.
259. See United States v. Porter, No. F06277-89, 1994 WL 742297 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 17,
1994) (discussing evidence of the laboratory error rate).
260. Williams v. State, 679 A.2d 1106, 1116-20 (Md. 1996).
261. The report stated that the committee had chosen to limit its remarks to the question of
"what aspects of the procedures used in connection with forensic DNA testing are scientifically
valid" NRC I1, supra note 1, at 185.
262. Id. at 86.
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corrective action.263 In these circumstances, the testimony could be
vulnerable to an objection under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which
requires the exclusion of evidence whose probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of prejudice, confusion of the issues, or undue
consumption of time.2"
A further objection is that the testimony represents inadmissible
character evidence.265 If the theory of logical relevance is merely that the
laboratory's past commission of errors increases the probability that the
laboratory erred on the occasion in question, then the theory amounts to
forbidden character reasoning.2 66 This is precisely the theory of logical
relevance generally banned by Federal Rule of Evidence 404.267
Moreover, to the extent that proficiency-test results constitute evidence
of specific acts introduced to show a general tendency to make mistakes,
they seem to run afoul of Rule 405, which forbids this form of character
263. Id. ("A laboratory is not likely to make the same error again."); see also NRC 1, supra note
232, at 89 (recognizing that "errors on proficiency tests do not necessarily reflect permanent
probabilities of false-positive or false-negative results").
264. Cf United States v. Lowe, 954 F. Supp. 401, 415-16 (D. Mass. 1996), qad, 145 F.3d 45
(1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting the argument that an expert must present an error rate from proficiency
tests along with the random-match probability).
265. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Coming to Grips with Scientific Research in Daubert's "Brave
New World": The Courts' Need to Appreciate the Evidentiary Dif/erences between Validity and
Proficiency Studies, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1247, 1273-78 (1995). A number of jurisdictions have
abolished the character-evidence prohibition as it applies to a defendant's character in certain types
of cases such as rape or child abuse. See FED. R. EVID. 413-15; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1108-1109.
In these jurisdictions that allow the prosecution to rely on an accused's past misconduct as
circumstantial proof of the charged offense, the defense conceivably could argue that the
differential treatment of the accused's inculpatory misconduct and the exculpatory proficiency test
results violates the equal protection guarantee. See, e.g., Nettles v. State, 683 So. 2d 9, 12 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1996). However, the constitutional attacks on character-evidence restrictions on
defense evidence have failed. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED & NORMAN M. GARLAND, EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE: THE ACCUSED'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INTRODUCE FAVORABLE EVIDENCE, 435-
72 (2d ed. 1996).
266. See, e.g., Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l, 828 F.2d 278, 287 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
that lower court erred by admitting pilot's low marks at flight school refresher course); see
generally I MCCORMICK, supra note 214, § 186.
267. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) provides that "[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait
of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion." Section (b) of the rule recognizes certain exceptions to this blanket rule of
exclusion, but none are apposite here. There also is an exception permitting a witness's opponent to
impeach the witness by questioning the witness about prior untruthful acts. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
However, those acts relate to the witness's character trait for untruthfulness, rather than the trait of
competence or proficiency. The Federal Rules expressly carve out the exception for untruthfulness,
but there is no comparable exception for the character trait of competence or proficiency.
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evidence.268 One might argue that the character rules do not apply to
entities such as a laboratory. However, the language of the rules is broad
enough to extend to businesses and other entities;269 and the cases have
generally construed the statutes as reaching entities as well as natural
persons.270
This issue is rarely recognized as a character-evidence problem in the
trial court,27' but a trial judge might find it difficult to justify overruling
a properly phrased character-evidence objection when the theory of
relevance is nothing more than a general tendency of the laboratory to
make mistakes. If there is a consensus that the jury sometimes needs the
proficiency-test results as an antidote to overwhelmingly small random-
match probabilities, then the federal and state rules governing character
evidence should be altered to give the trial court the discretion to admit
the evidence.272
268. Federal Rule of Evidence 405(a) provides that "[iln all cases in which evidence of character
or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or
by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant
specific instances of conduct.' FED. R. EVID. 405(a). Section (b) permits specific act evidence only
when character is "in issue"-a term of art that has no application to the tendency of laboratory
personnel to make mistakes in performing DNA tests. See I MCCORMICK, supra note 214, § 187.
269. Federal Rule of Evidence 404 refers to a "person," and the accompanying Advisory
Committee Note states that the drafters drew on the California character statutes. FED. R. EVID.
404. California Evidence Code § 175 defines "person" as including a "firm, association,
organization, partnership, business trust, corporation, limited liability company, or public entity."
CAL. EVID. CODE § 175. Moreover, the complex of character rules includes the habit doctrine, and
Federal Rule of Evidence 406, codifying that doctrine, expressly applies to "an organization." FED.
R. EVID. 406.
270. See generally I EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 2:04
(rev. ed. 1999); see also Susanna M. Kim, Characteristics of Soulless Persons: The Applicability of
the Character Evidence Rule to Corporations, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 763.
271. But see United States v. Shea, 957 F. Supp. 331, 344 nA2 (D.N.H. 1997) ("The parties
assume that error rate information is admissible at trial. This assumption may well be incorrect.
Even though a laboratory or industry error rate may be logically relevant, a strong argument can be
made that such evidence is barred by Fed. R. Evid. 404 because it is inadmissible propensity
evidence."); Unmack v. Deaconess Med. Ctr., 967 P.2d 783, 784-86 (Mont. 1998) (going to the
brink of explicitly holding that the character evidence prohibition bars testimony about prior
incidents of unskillful conduct).
272. Courts also generally have not addressed the impact of the character-evidence ban on
expert testimony about the conditions under which eyewitness identifications are likely to be in
error. Such testimony is unusual, and exclusion almost invariably is upheld on appeal. In the rare
cases where appellate courts have held that the failure to admit the evidence was an abuse of
discretion, they have not mentioned the rule against character evidence. See State v. Chapple, 660
P.2d 1208, 1217-24 (Ariz. 1983); People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 715-27 (Cal. 1984). Of
course, much of this type of testimony falls outside the character-evidence rule. Thus, the rule does
not ban testimony that "weapons focus" interferes with the accuracy of eyewitness identifications
any more than it bans testimony that handling DNA samples from the suspect and the crime scene
463
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Moreover, both the bench and bar should appreciate that in some
circumstances proficiency tests of the laboratory involved in the case
should be held admissible without relaxing the ban on character
evidence. The ban applies only when the sole theory of logical relevance
is that the existence of errors in the past suggests a tendency to err that
might affect the result in the case at bar. There might be situations in
which the defense can use the test data at trial on an entirely different
theory of logical relevance. Assume, for instance, that the experts in a
case disagree over whether a peak or a band observed in a DNA test is
due to an allele or is an artifact." 3 Evidence that spurious peaks or bands
have occurred under similar circumstances in proficiency tests of the
laboratory on known samples would lend support to the defense theory
that the peak or band in the pending case is an artifact. 74 In this
situation, proficiency-test data are relevant because they provide
information about the operating characteristics of the DNA test at that
particular laboratory. 75
without taking precautions against cross-contamination can produce false matches. On the other
hand, testimony that people err in their identifications a specified fraction of the time resembles
testimony about the incidence of medical mistakes in hospitals, the safety record of airlines, and
the like. These error statistics the law traditionally excludes.
273. Artifacts in RFLP testing with gel electrophoresis and visualization by autoradiography are
mentioned supra note 222.
274. STR typing uses capillary electrophoresis, in which much smaller amounts of DNA are
drawn through sieving material in an exquisitely thin tube. A smaller STR fragment travels through
this capillary faster than a longer one. The fragments are labeled with a fluorescent dye and a laser
continuously illuminates a detection window near the end of the capillary. When the laser light
strikes an allele passing by the window, the dye fluoresces, and a charged coupled device (CCD) in
a camera responds to the intensity of the fluorescent light. The signal is flat before the allele passes
by, peaks when the allele is in the window, and then drops back to the zero level. The allele size is
determined by software that compares the time at which the peak appears to the times measured for
a "ladder" of fragments whose lengths are known. See NCFDNA, supra note 184, at 52-53.
275. Of course, even when the proficiency test data would be admissible and the defense has a
legitimate need to discover this type of information, there might be means of satisfying the need
other than by furnishing proficiency-test results. By way of example, a sampling of the laboratory's
case work could meet the need. However, in most cases permitting discovery of proficiency-test
data may be preferable. It will likely be more convenient for the laboratory to reveal the
proficiency test data, because that data have already been compiled and giving the defense access
to actual case work could compromise the privacy of the persons involved in those cases. When the
defense needs to discover information about the operating characteristics of a laboratory's test for a
purpose other than merely establishing the laboratory's general error rate, the data could prove to
be admissible at trial; hence, the courts would not be justified in denying discovery of proficiency-
test results on the ground that such discovery cannot lead to the production of admissible evidence
at trial.
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c. The Use ofProficiency Tests To Modify Random-Match
Probabilities
The third argument relating to proficiency testing is that estimates of
the probability that a randomly selected person would have the DNA
type found in a crime-scene sample should be inadmissible unless
accompanied by or blended with the laboratory's error rate.276 The 1996
committee observed that combining the probability of a random match
with the probability of error "would deprive the trier of fact of the
opportunity to evaluate separately the possibility that the profiles match
by coincidence as opposed to the possibility that they are reported to
match by reason of laboratory or handling error." '277 The committee took
the position that "a calculation that combines error rates with match
276. Combining the random-match probability with the probability of a false-positive laboratory
error according to the rules governing conditional probabilities would give the jury an estimate of
the probability that the laboratory would report a match if the source of the crime-scene DNA was
not the defendant. To see how this might be done requires a few symbols. Let T stand for the DNA
type of the crime-scene sample, and let RT be the event that the laboratory reports this type when it
tests a sample. Let S be the hypothesis that a defendant is the source of the crime-scene sample,
and let-S be the hypothesis that someone else is. Finally, let DT be the event that defendant's DNA
actually is type T, and D-T be the event the defendant's DNA is of some other type. Then the
chance that a person who is not the source of this sample would have DNA of type T is P(DJ-S),
where P(DTI-S) stands for the conditional probability of DT given -S. Suppose further that the
chance that the laboratory would report that this individual is type T when he is not is P(RTID.T).
Then the probability of a reported match when the defendant is not the source is
P(RTI-S) = P(RTIDT)P(Dr--S) + P(R[D_T)P(D_T-S) (1)
But P(R-dDr) is the probability that the laboratory would report type T given that the defendant's
DNA is type T. At a well-run laboratory, the probability of a true positive is very close to 1.
Likewise, P(D_--S) is the probability that a defendant's DNA would not be type T given that the
defendant is not the source of the type T DNA from the crime-scene. Since type T is rare, this
probability also is close to one. Consequently, a good approximation for the probability of a
reported match when the defendant is not the source is
P(Rrt-S) = P(DrI-S) + P(RtD.T) (2)
It follows from (2) that when random-match probabilities are orders of magnitude smaller than
estimates of the chance of a laboratory error of some kind, the possible error rate derived from
proficiency testing dominates the combined error risk:
if P(RTIDT) - P(Dr[-S), then P(RTI-S) = P(RTIDT) (3)
See Thompson, supra note 252, at 421 n.59 (1997). For example, if the risk of a false positive is
1/10,000, and the chance that the defendant shares the DNA type of the sample by coincidence is
1/1,000,000, it follows from (2) that
P(R-S) _= 1/1,000,000 + 100/1,000,000 = 101/1,000,000
Compared to the effect of the false positive probability, the impact of the random-match
probability on the chance of reported match is a negligible one part in a hundred for this example.
277. NRC II, supra note 1, at 85.
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probabilities is inappropriate. ''278 The reasoning supporting the commit-
tee's position essentially sounds under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.279
If anything, the Rule 403 objection is more substantial here than when it
is urged as a basis for excluding testimony offered to impeach the
laboratory's competence. In this situation, the questions about the
validity of industry-wide error rates and the staleness of even the
laboratory's own tests are equally applicable and call into question the
probative worth of the testimony. Moreover, there is a heightened risk
that the jury will be confused. Error rates and random-match probabil-
ities relate to distinct hypotheses, and a lay juror may find it difficult to
understand the significance of a computation which merges the rates and
the probability. That mode of computation could place even greater
strain on the jurors' ability to comprehend the body of evidence
submitted to them.28° The few courts that have addressed the argument
that error rates should be used to the exclusion of random-match
probabilities have not been persuaded.28'
d. The Opportunity To Retest As a Response to Defense Arguments
About Proficiency Testing
While defense counsel originated the first three suggestions, the
fourth suggestion related to proficiency testing has been made by
prosecutors. The thrust of this suggestion is that when the defense is
allowed to introduce evidence of proficiency tests of the laboratory
employing the prosecution's expert to suggest that the laboratory is
prone to err, the prosecution should be permitted to present testimony
that the defense has not retested or even requested the opportunity to
retest the samples analyzed by the prosecution's expert.
The testimony would be logically relevant under several theories.
First, if a defense expert testifies that the laboratory result is untrust-
278. Id. at 87.
279. See generallj Margaret A. Berger, Laboratory Error Seen Through the Lens of Science and
Policy, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081 (1997).
280. Jason Schklar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and
Expectancies, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 179 (1999) (concluding that separate figures are
desirable in that "[j]urors ... may need to know the disaggregated elements that influence the
aggregated estimate as well as how they were combined in order to evaluate the DNA test results in
the context of their background beliefs and the other evidence introduced at trial").
281. See, e.g., Armstead v. State, 673 A.2d 221, 245-46 (Md. 1996) (rejecting the argument that
the introduction of a random-match probability deprives the defendant of due process because the
error rate on proficiency tests is many orders of magnitude greater than the match probability).
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worthy, the failure to retest would be relevant to impeach the defense
expert's credibility on the ground that a scientist who truly doubted the
accuracy of the analysis normally would have retested the samples to
resolve the matter.282 Inasmuch as replication is a crucial and common
feature of scientific inquiry,283 it could be argued that neglecting to retest
is prior inconsistent conduct. On this theory, the defense would be
entitled to a limiting instruction to the effect that the expert's failure to
retest is not offered to show that the test result is correct, but only to
demonstrate that the defense expert is not sincere in asserting that it is
flawed.
284
The probative value of a failure to retest in showing an expert's
insincerity, however, is open to question. It is not uncommon for
scientists to question in print or otherwise the adequacy of another
researcher's experiment before undertaking to replicate it. And even if
such opinions were unheard of in the course of ordinary science, the
expert may have been retained for the limited purpose of giving an
opinion on the adequacy of the testing that was done rather than redoing
that testing. Nevertheless, the inference of insincerity need not be
particularly strong for the "inconsistent" conduct to be a proper,
logically relevant subject for cross-examination.28
Second, if the defense expert offers an opinion that the laboratory's
results may be in error, the expert's failure to request or conduct an
independent test would be relevant to suggest that the jury should give
less weight to that opinion.286 The prosecution could argue to the jury
that an expert who fails to use a more definitive and readily available
procedure for ascertaining whether the initial test results are correct has
not been thorough in evaluating those results, and that such experts
282. This theory does not apply if the defense introduces the proficiency-test data by cross-
examining the prosecution's experts rather than producing its own expert.
283. See, e.g., Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake ofDaubert: A New Search for
Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 716, 776-78 (1994); George Rice et al., Male
Homosexuality: Absence ofLinkage to Microsatellite Markers atXq28, 284 SCIENCE 665 (1999).
284. FED. R. EVID. 105.
285. The impeaching statement or conduct "need only bend in a different direction." JOHN M.
MCNAUGHT & HAROLD FLANNERY, MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE: A COURTROOM REFERENCE 13-5
(1988).
286. Thus, in People v. Oliver, 713 N.E.2d 727 (111. App. Ct. 1999), the State was allowed to
show that a defense expert who questioned the results of DNA tests had done no testing of his own.
See id. at 736 ("[I]t was proper for the prosecution to bring out on cross-examination that the
defense criticisms of the prosecution's expert witnesses were not based on any independent testing
that it had done.").
Washington Law Review
deserve little credence because the basis for the opinion is not as
complete as it could be. Again, the inference may be debatable, but the
standard of relevance, particularly on cross-examination, is lenient.287
Third, whether or not a defense expert discusses proficiency tests, the
prosecution could argue that the defense's failure to retest (or to request
a retest) amounts to an admission of the accuracy of the initial test by
conduct by the defendant.288 The courts have applied the admission-by-
conduct theory to a litigant's failure to present evidence when "it would
be natural" for the litigant to introduce such testimony.219 The
prosecution might urge that it would be natural for a defendant affected
by a false match to seek retesting and that it would be natural for a DNA
expert who entertained serious doubts about the accuracy of a prior test
to retest the samples.2 90
In short, there are reasonable arguments for permitting the prose-
cution to raise the issue of retesting when a defendant questions the
laboratory's ability to type DNA samples correctly. But even if the
inquiry is probative of the insincerity or lack of thoroughness of the
expert, or an admission by the defendant, there are potential objections
to this counterthrust by the prosecution. One objection is that the inquiry
is inconsistent with the prosecution's burden of proof.2 91 To reinforce the
allocation of the burden to the government, some courts generally forbid
prosecution comment on the defense failure to produce evidence. 92 The
argument runs that the defense is entitled to rely on the burden and has
no obligation to present any evidence at trial. According to this line of
argument, it is improper to convert the defense's failure to present
testimony into prosecution evidence. 93 Under this line of authority, the
287. FED. R. EvID. 401; United States v. Casares-Cardenas, 14 F.3d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir.)
("Relevance is established by any showing, however slight, that makes it more or less likely ... "),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 849 (1996); United States v. Nason, 9 F.3d 155, 162 (1st Cir. 1993) ("The
threshold for relevance is very low under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 .').
288. 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 214, § 264.
289. Id. § 264, at 174.
290. On this theory, the defense is not entitled to a limiting instruction; an admission by conduct
qualifies as substantive evidence. Id.; FED. R. EvID. 105.
291. People v. Harbold, 464 N.E.2d 734, 741 (I1. App. Ct. 1984) ("[A]rguments which diminish
the presumption of innocence are forbidden.").
292. Hayes v. State, 660 So. 2d 257, 265-66 (Fla. 1995); People v. Wills, 502 N.E.2d 775, 777-
78 (111. App. Ct. 1986); State v. Primus, 535 S.E.2d 152, 156-57 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000).
293. A related argument looks to the privilege against self-incrimination. Grifin v. California,
380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965), teaches that the prosecution may not comment on the accused's
invocation of the privilege. However, a prosecutor's statement that the defense has not introduced
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defense could bar prosecution comment about the defense's failure to
retest the DNA sample. However, even in such a jurisdiction, if the
defense overreached, prosecution comment might be permitted as an
invited response.294 In addition, some jurisdictions reject that line of
authority and allow comment on the defense's failure to present
exculpatory evidence,295 so long as the trial judge clearly instructs the
jury that the prosecution has the ultimate burden of proof.
A further objection is that the admission of the testimony is
inconsistent with the defendant's attorney-client privilege. A number of
jurisdictions apply the attorney-client privilege when, as part of trial
preparation, defense counsel hires an expert to evaluate private infor-
mation from the defendant, such as the defendant's mental or physical
condition.296 The Advisory Committee Note to draft Federal Rule of
Evidence 503 endorsed the application of the attorney-client privilege to
experts297 and some courts have gone to the length of invoking the
theory even when the expert did not evaluate information realistically
originating from the defendant. 98 Based on these authorities, the defense
might contend that the attorney-client privilege applies to a defense
expert's retest of a DNA sample. The gist of the objection would be that
if the result of a retest would be privileged, it is wrong-minded to
penalize the defense for failing to retest.
rebuttal expert testimony would not amount to impermissible comment. Courts have held that
similar statements from the prosecution were improper only when the defendant was the only
potential witness who could contradict the prosecution. See Bergmann v. McCaughtry, 65 F.3d
1372, 1377 (7th Cir. 1992). In a case involving DNA, the prosecutor's comments would relate to
potential rebuttal testimony by an expert witness rather than any testimony from the accused.
294. See Wise v. State, 751 A.2d 24,33-35 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
295. See Van Woudenberg ex rel. Foor v. Gibson, 211 F.3d 560, 570 (10th Cir. 2000) ('The
prosecutor may ... comment on the defendant's failure to present evidence or call witnesses");
People v. Guzman, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 87,91 (Ct. App. 2000).
296. See Miller v. District Court, 737 P.2d 834, 838 (Colo. 1987); State v. Pratt, 398 A.2d 421,
422-26 (Md. 1979); Van White v. State, 990 P.2d 253, 269-71 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999); State v.
Riddle, 964 P.2d 1056, 1063, modified, 969 P.2d 1032 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); Note, Disclosures by
Criminal Defendant to Defense-Retained Psychiatrist Held Within Scope of Attorney-Client
Privilege Which Defendant Does Not Waive by Pleading Insanity, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 99, 111
(1979).
297. As enacted, Rule 503 leaves the recognition and development of privileges under federal
law to the courts. FED R. EVID. 503. The original draft would have codified and defined the
privileges. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 229-57 (West Group 2000). Its description of the
attomey-client privilege remains useful to courts as they continue to define and refine that
privilege. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE 108-14 (David A. Schlueter ed., 3d ed. 1998).
298. Riddle, 964 P.2d at 1063-64 (regarding accident-reconstruction expert).
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As with the other suggestions related to proficiency testing, the case
law offers little guidance. In principle, it would seem that once the
defense has sharpened the issue of the prosecution expert's use of proper
test procedures, the prosecution should be allowed to elicit testimony
about the defense's failure to retest at least to probe the basis for the
expert's opinion and as circumstantial evidence of defendant's belief
that retesting would not yield a different result. The fact that the
prosecution has the burden of persuasion does not make such inferences
impermissible.299 The constitutional requirement for proof beyond a
reasonable doubt regulates the quantum of proof the prosecution must
present, but no court has invoked the requirement to preclude the
prosecution from introducing an otherwise admissible item of evidence.
In appropriate circumstances, the majority of courts permit prosecutors
to comment on a defendant's failure to produce evidence such as an
available witness who would presumably corroborate the defendant's
testimony. 3°
°
Neither should the attomey-client privilege pose an insurmountable
barrier. Certainly, the prosecution cannot comment on a defendant's
decision to exercise a constitutional privilege,"' and comment on a
defendant's failure to produce a witness is often forbidden when the
defendant stands in a privileged relationship with the witness." 2
Consequently, it might be justifiable to apply the attomey-client
privilege to a defense expert's actual analysis of material that has
become available because of the defendant's exercise of the right to
prepare a defense with the assistance of counsel. Perhaps material that
both emanates from the defendant and is still confidential would fall into
this category. However, these conditions do not seem to be satisfied in
299. Thus, in Fluellen v. Campbell, 683 F. Supp. 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1987), defense counsel
argued that the state's case was weakened by the fact that it failed to have blood tests performed,
and the prosecutor remarked in rebuttal, "if he ... thinks that is such good evidence, why didn't he
request that it be done?" Id. at 189. The federal district court found that "this comment in no way
imposed upon the jury a presumption which conflicted 'with the overriding presumption of
innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the
crime."' Id. (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952)).
300. See Alan Stephens, Annotation, Adverse Presumption or Inference Based on Party's
Failure to Produce or Examine Family Members Other than Spouse-Modern Cases, 80 A.L.R.4th
337, 344 (1990); Alan Stephens, Annotation, Adverse Presumption or Inference Based on Party's
Failure to Produce or Examine Friend-Modern Cases, 79 A.L.R.4th 779, 785-86 (1990).
301. Most, but not all, jurisdictions also forbid comment on the invocation of a statutory or
common law privilege. See I MCCORMICK, supra note 214, § 74. 1, at 307-08.
302. See, e.g., Alan Stephens, Annotation, Adverse Presumption or Inference Based on Party's
Failure to Produce or Examine Spouse-Modern Cases, 79 A.L.R.4th 694, 701-02 (1990).
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this setting. The DNA sample that the defendant suggests has been
improperly analyzed might be crime-scene material that was not
obtained from the defendant, or it could be a sample that the prosecution
lawfully acquired from the defendant. In these situations, the attorney-
client privilege should not preclude adverse comment on the defense's
failure to retest.
B. Extending the Period of Statutes ofLimitations
The power of DNA evidence has prompted proposals to create an
exception to the statute of limitations for sexual assault when DNA
profiling links the suspect to the assault.30 3 Moreover, some prosecutors
have attempted to avoid the tolling of the statute by filing "John Doe"
arrest warrants based solely on a description of the unnamed assailant's
DNA. 3' However, devising a workable "DNA exception" that would
respect the interests of defendants and society in defining a point after
303. In May 1998, for example, the Illinois Senate approved House Bill No. 2257, which
provides:
[l]f the identity of the accused is unknown and at the time of the offense physical evidence is
collected that is capable of being tested for its DNA characteristics which would identify the
accused, a prosecution for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, criminal sexual assault
or aggravated criminal sexual assault may be commenced at any time.
1997 H.B. 2257, 90th Gen. Assembly (Il1. 1998); see also, e.g., 2000 S.B. 2347, 209th Leg., 2d
Sess. (N.J. 2001) (eliminating the statute of limitations for prosecuting criminal sexual contact and
endanger-ing the welfare of child "if the identity of the defendant may be determined by physical
evidence capable of forensic deoxyribonucleic (DNA) testing"); Staff and Wire Reports, 77th
Legislature, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 24, 2001, at 6, available at 2001 WL 5148152
(reporting the signing of legislation "that ends the statute of limitations for sexual assault if a DNA
sample from the attacker is available but no one has been apprehended"); cf. 2001 S.B. 152, 141st
Gen. Assem. (Del. 2001) (providing that "[i]n any indictment for a crime in which the identity of
the accused is unknown it is sufficient to describe the accused as a person whose name is unknown
but who has a particular DNA profile").
304. See, e.g., Richard Willing, Mystery Suspects Charged Through DNA, USA TODAY, Apr. 3,
2000, at 3A, available at 2000 WL 5773965 (reporting that "California, New York, Oklahoma,
Utah and Wisconsin have filed such DNA-based charges so far" and that "[s]imilar charges are
imminent in two more states, and prosecutors say dozens more could be filed by year's end"). The
first case to be commenced on the basis of such charges is pending in Sacramento. See Erin
Hallissy & Charlie Goodyear, Databank Match Brings Arrest on DNA Warrant, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
25, 2000, at A3, available at 2000 WL 6494988; Richard Willing, Police Expand DNA Use,
Charge Man with Rape Using Only Genetic Profile, USA TODAY, Oct. 25, 2000, at IA, available
at 2000 WL 5793574.
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which litigation no longer can be commenced is a formidable
challenge. °5
Statutes of limitations serve a variety of purposes. Most obviously,
they protect individuals against the risk that they will unable to assemble
adequate evidence for a defense because too much time has passed since
the alleged crime was committed. With time, memories fade, evidence is
misplaced, witnesses become harder to locate, and the accused's ability
to defend himself is reduced.3"6 Thus, the Supreme Court has described
statutes of limitations as "the primary guarantee against bringing overly
stale criminal charges.""3 7 In addition, they give innocent (as well as
guilty individuals) a certain peace of mind and encourage the police to
move on to more recent cases that are more likely to be solved and for
which punishment would be more effective.30 8
A DNA exception attends only to the first justification for statutes of
limitations. If a comparison of the defendant's DNA with the trace
evidence DNA collected many years ago were to establish conclusively
that the defendant is guilty,30 9 then it could be argued that any
degradation in the defendant's ability to mount a defense would be
harmless because it could not affect the outcome of the trial. For
example, even when a defendant's alibi witness had died after the
305. See Jonathan W. Diehl, Note, Drafting a Fair DNA Exception to the Statute of Limitations
in Sexual Assault Cases, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 431 (1999). Portions of this Article's discussion of
statutes of limitations are adapted, without further attribution, from this note.
306. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 (1971).
307. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966); see also Marion, 404 U.S. at 322;
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06 cmt. 1, at 86 (1985); Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The
Puzzling Purposes ofStatutes ofLimitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 458 (1997). The Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment also provides protection, but only when the defendant establishes that the
delay not only substantially prejudiced the defense, but also that it was a tactical ploy by the
prosecutor. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977); Marion, 404 U.S. at 324. The
Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment offers the defendant no protection against
preindictment delay. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 313.
308. The need for specific deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution usually fades with time.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06 cmt. 1, at 86.
309. DNA evidence does not grow stale with the passage of time. Even ancient DNA sometimes
can be analyzed successfully. See, e.g., ANCIENT DNA: RECOVERY AND ANALYSIS OF GENETIC
MATERIAL FROM PALEONTOLOGICAL, ARCHAEOLOGICAL, MUSEUM, MEDICAL, AND FORENSIC
SPECIMENS (B. Herrmann & S. Hummel eds., 1994); Richard Willing, Fear Keeps Up as DNA
Science Speeds Forward, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2000, at 26A, available at 2000 WL 577365
(reporting a case in Britain in which a thirty-seven-year-old saliva stain on a postage stamp helped
exonerate a man hung in 1962 for murder). However, the ability of fragments of the DNA molecule
to remain intact virtually indefinitely under certain conditions is not dispositive. Indeed, if the
prosecution relies on DNA profiling of a stain shortly after a fairly fresh crime-scene sample first
was collected, it is not even pertinent.
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statutory period, if no reasonable jury could have believed the alibi in
the face of the DNA proof, the availability of the witness could not have
resulted in an acquittal.
The premise that DNA evidence is dispositive, however, is not always
true. First, there are cases in which a defendant might succeed in raising
a reasonable doubt about the reported results of the DNA tests. This
situation would arise, for instance, when there is reason to think that
samples were switched or cross-contaminated in the laboratory or in the
collecting and handling of the trace evidence before it reached the
laboratory. Many years later, the police officers and laboratory
personnel involved could be impossible to locate, and the written
records remaining might be inadequate to resolve these claims.
Second, even if one were to conclude that such cases are too rare to
be an obstacle to creating an exception to the statute, DNA evidence can
be conclusive only as to one factual issue-whether the DNA in the
trace evidence somehow originated from the defendant. Without more,
proof of that factual issue ordinarily falls far short of demonstrating guilt
for every type of sexual assault. Thus, a defendant's semen might be
present on an alleged victim's clothing or a bedsheet even if there had
been no penetration, and it would be expected to be found in a vaginal
swab if the sex had been consensual.310
The legislature might try to respond to these concerns by confining
the DNA exception to cases in which identity is the only issue that needs
to be resolved.311 But which cases are these? Can a defendant avoid the
extension of the period of limitations by conceding his identity as the
source of the trace evidence but alleging that he reasonably believed that
the woman invited his actions, that he was acting under duress, or the
like? Should the court be required to find that these defenses have no
basis in fact for the prosecution to proceed after the statute has run? It
might be possible to draft a suitably sensitive DNA exception to the
310. For reports of successful consent defenses in sexual assault cases involving DNA evidence,
see Smith v. State, 734 N.E.2d 706,708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (observing that the defendant who had
advanced a consent defense at a previous trial for rape had been acquitted despite the DNA
evidence against him in that case); Dean Wise, Jury Acquits Man of Rape, YORK DAILY REC., Oct.
25, 2000, at C04, available at 2000 WL 27979596 (reporting that although the state of Maryland
established that "the chances of the semen having come from a [randomly selected] man other than
Vinson within the African-American population was one in 2.3 quadrillion," and although the
defendant denied the allegation of intercourse, he had had a previous intimate relationship with the
alleged victim for eighteen months).
311. The requirement in some bills that "the identity of the accused [be] unknown" points in this
direction. See supra note 303.
473
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statute of limitations, but the task is not so simple as, initially, it might
appear to be.
In contrast, the situation is much simpler when a defendant brings
forward DNA evidence in a case involving a single rapist that shows that
the DNA in the trace evidence is not his. If that evidence is believed,
then he is not the guilty party. But while DNA evidence can be
conclusive of innocence, DNA evidence is not logically sufficient to
prove guilt. Because identity is not the only element of the offense and
because there are affirmative defenses that can be pled, even when the
state brings forward incontestable DNA evidence of identity, the
defendant might not be guilty of sexual assault. Consequently, it would
be consistent to advocate an extension of the period in which post-
conviction relief can be sought312 while opposing an extension of the
statute of limitations.
CONCLUSION
This Article has canvassed a wide variety of issues. Some are
constitutional in nature, others are statutory, and still others arise at
common law. The character of the issues ranges from substantive
criminal law to procedure to evidence. While the issues are diverse, they
share two related common denominators. One is their relative novelty,
and the other is the consequent paucity of case law analyzing the issues.
In the past decade, a dizzying array of DNA technologies-from gel
electrophoreses of single-locus RFLPs, to PCR-based studies of STRs,
to mitochondrial DNA sequencing-has materialized in American court-
rooms. The predictable result has been a proliferation of evidentiary
issues. Yet, several important questions have received little in the way of
careful consideration. This Article has identified and ventured answers
to these questions. As stated at the outset, despite their novelty, some of
these issues admit of relatively clear answers. In other cases, though,
their resolution will demand a sophisticated balancing of competing
public policy considerations. If the criminal justice system is to realize
the full potential of DNA technology while maintaining its essential
fairness, the system must come to grips with these issues in short order.
312. For recommended procedures of handling requests for DNA testing after conviction, see
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
POSTCONVICTION RELIEF (1999).
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